-
作者：Heim, Sven; Hueschelrath, Kai; Laitenberger, Ulrich; Spiegel, Yossi
作者单位：Universite PSL; MINES ParisTech; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We address the growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may lessen competition, using the introduction of national leniency programs (LPs) as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements. Based on data from 63 countries, we find a large and significant immediate increase in domestic horizontal MS acquisitions once an LP is introduced but only in countries where the LP is deemed to be effective. There is no effect on non-horizontal or cross-border MS acquisitions. Our fi...
-
作者：Cheng, Ing-Haw; Hsiaw, Alice
作者单位：University of Toronto; Brandeis University
摘要：We model the reporting of sexual misconduct. Individuals underreport misconduct due to strategic uncertainty over whether others will report and corroborate a pattern of behavior. Underreporting occurs if and only if misconduct is widespread. Making sanctions more responsive to reports, raising public awareness of misconduct, implementing con-fidential holding tanks, and appropriately calibrating damage awards can encourage reporting. However, we also show when such policies are ineffective or...
-
作者：Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Copenhagen
摘要：Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such naive consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad review that is revealed in equilibrium as good news about product quality. This makes bad reviews worth revealing and allows the seller to use them to signal his product's quality to rational consumers.
-
作者：Dessein, Wouter; Lo, Desmond (Ho-Fu); Minami, Chieko
作者单位：Columbia University; Santa Clara University; Kobe University
摘要：We explore the relationship between the volatility of a firm's local environment and its organizational structure. Using micro-level data on managers working for a large retailer, we empirically test and provide support for our theory that a more volatile local environment results in more decentralization only when the need for coordination among subunits is low. In contrast, more local volatility is associated with more centralization when coordination needs are high. Our evi-dence supports t...
-
作者：DellaVigna, Stefano; Pope, Devin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：How robust are experimental results to changes in design? And can researchers anticipate which changes matter most? We consider a real-effort task with multiple behavioral treatments and examine the stability along six dimensions: (i) pure replication, (ii) demographics, (iii) geography and culture, (iv) the task, (v) the output measure, and (vi) the presence of a consent form. We find near-perfect replication of the experimental results and full stability of the results across demographics, s...
-
作者：Kovach, Matthew; Tserenjigmid, Gerelt
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：We introduce the Focal Luce Model (FLM), a random choice model that generalizes Luce's (1959) model (multinomial logit) to account for menu-dependent focality of alternatives. In the FLM, focal alter-natives are relatively more likely to be chosen even after taking utili-ties into account. The FLM captures a variety of bounded rationality models while behaviorally distinguishing between what is focal and the magnitude of the bias from focality. We show how to identify util-ities, focal sets, a...
-
作者：Migrow, Dmitri; Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：University of Calgary; University of British Columbia
摘要：We study the interaction between productive investment and per-suasion activities in a principal???agent setting with strategic dis-closure. In an attempt to persuade the principal, the agent diverts substantial resources from productive activities to information acquisition for persuasion, even though productive activities are more efficient and raise the chances of success in persuasion. The equilibrium outcomes of simultaneous and sequential allocation procedures are the same, because the v...
-
作者：Teh, Tat-How
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：Platforms that intermediate trades-such as Amazon, Airbnb, and eBay-play a regulatory role in deciding how to govern the marketplaces they create. We propose a framework to analyze a platform's nonprice governance design and its incentive to act in a welfare-enhancing manner. We show that the platform's governance design can be distorted toward inducing insufficient or excessive seller competition, depending on the nature of the fee instrument employed by the platform. These results are illust...
-
作者：Acharya, Avidit; Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Stanford University; Boston University
摘要：We construct a model of collective search in which players gradually approach the Pareto frontier. The players have imperfect control over which improvements to the status quo will be considered. Inefficiency takes place due to the difficulty in finding improvements acceptable to both parties. The process is path dependent, with early agreements determining long-run outcomes. It may also be cyclical, as players alternate between being more and less accommodating.
-
作者：Ghani, Tarek; Reed, Tristan
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); The World Bank
摘要：Firms use relational contracts to support repeated trade. Do these informal agreements evolve in response to market conditions? In a market for ice, firms reestablish relationships on new terms when a prior agreement breaks down. Using transaction data, we show that ice retailers prioritize deliveries to loyal buyers-fishing firms when supply from the monopolistic manufacturer is scarce. After an upstream shock to competition increases supply, repeated trade lapses, threatening retailers' posi...
