American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

最新文章

• Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists AI翻译
  作者：Hansen, Emanuel
  作者单位：University of Cologne
  摘要：This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on politi-cal platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of political equilibria with two competing parties and with one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, the distance between both platforms is always positive but limited, in contrast to the median voter mode...
• Trust Building in Credence Goods Markets AI翻译
  作者：Fong, Yuk-fai; Liu, Ting; Meng, Xiaoxuan
  作者单位：University of Hong Kong; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
  摘要：We study trust building in credence-goods markets in a dynamic setting. When consumers' expected loss is low and it is efficient to fix only the more severe problem, there is no trade in the one-shot game. In the repeated game, an expert's honesty is monitored through consumers' rejection of his recommendations. The expert's profit in the optimal equilibrium weakly increases in the discount factor but does not achieve the first best, which contrasts sharply with the optimal equilibrium in expe...
• Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice AI翻译
  作者：Kleiner, Andreas; Moldovanu, Benny
  作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Bonn
  摘要：We study how parliaments and committees select one out of several alternatives when options cannot be ordered along a left-right axis. Which voting agendas are used in practice, and how should they be designed? We assume that preferences are single peaked on a tree and study convex agendas where, at each stage in the voting pro-cess, the tree of remaining alternatives is divided into two subtrees that are subjected to a Yes-No vote. We show that strategic voting coincides with sincere, unsophi...
• False Positives and Transparency AI翻译
  作者：Libgober, Jonathan
  作者单位：University of Southern California
  摘要：I develop a theoretical model of costly information acquisition in order to evaluate transparency requirements in empirical research. A sender chooses an experiment characterized by multiple dimensions, while a receiver observes the experiment's outcome (though not necessarily all dimensions). I show that the receiver may prefer to keep dimensions hidden, even those contributing to bias, despite preferring more informative experiments. This can occur if the perception of bias is lessened when ...
• Learning in Relational Contracts AI翻译
  作者：Kostadinov, Rumen; Kuvalekar, Aditya
  作者单位：McMaster University; University of Essex
  摘要：We study relational contracts between a firm and a worker with mutual uncertainty about match quality. The worker's actions are publicly observed and generate both output and information about the match quality. We show that the relational contracts may be inefficient. We characterize the inefficiency through a holdup problem on the contemporaneous output. In the frequent action limit, these inefficiencies persist if and only if information degrades at least at the same rate at which impatienc...
• Communication and Cooperation in Markets AI翻译
  作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Miller, David A.
  作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
  摘要：Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incen-tive compatible. We find that if each side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives are satisfied only when the volume of trade is low. By contrast, if only one side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives do not constrain the volume of supportable trade. A...
• Stochastic Equilibria: Noise in Actions or Beliefs?† AI翻译
  作者：Friedman, Evan
  作者单位：University of Essex
  摘要：We introduce noisy belief equilibrium (NBE) for normal-form games in which players best respond to noisy belief realizations. Axioms restrict belief distributions to be unbiased with respect to and responsive to changes in the opponents' behavior. The axioms impose testable restrictions both within and across games, and we compare these restrictions to those of regular quantal response equi-librium (QRE) in which axioms are placed on the quantal response function as the primitive. NBE can gene...
• Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment AI翻译
  作者：Bezin, Emeline; Verdier, Thierry; Zenou, Yves
  作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Monash University
  摘要：We develop a two-period overlapping generations model in which both the family structure and the decision to commit crime are endog-enous and the dynamics of moral norms of good conduct is trans-mitted intergenerationally by families and peers. By destroying biparental families and putting fathers in prison, we show that more intense crime repression can backfire because it increases the possi-bility that criminals' sons become criminals themselves. Our model also explains the emergence and pe...
• Screening Dominance: A Comparison of Noisy Signals† AI翻译
  作者：Lagziel, David; Lehrer, Euud
  作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University
  摘要：This paper studies the impact of noisy signals on screening pro-cesses. It deals with a decision problem in which a decision-maker screens a set of elements based on noisy unbiased evaluations. Given that the decision-maker uses threshold strategies, we show that addi-tional binary noise can potentially improve a screening, an effect that resembles a lucky coin toss. We compare different noisy sig-nals under threshold strategies and optimal ones, and we provide several characterizations of ca...
• Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments AI翻译
  作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
  作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL)
  摘要：We show that the treatment effect estimated by standard methods such as regression discontinuity analysis or difference-in-differences may contain a transient ???learning effect??? that is entangled with the long-term effect of the treatment. This learning effect occurs when the variable of interest is the agents???efforts, when treatment and con-trol correspond to success or failure: success or failure gives agents information about how much their effort matters, and consequently changes the ...