Searching Forever After

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Antler, Yair; Bachi, Benjamin
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200020
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 558-590
• 关键词: 2-sided search; marriages; selection; neglect; MODEL

摘要

We study a model of two-sided search in which agents' strategic reasoning is coarse. In equilibrium, the most desirable agents behave as if they were fully rational, while for all other agents, coarse reasoning results in overoptimism with regard to their prospects in the market. Consequently, they search longer than is optimal. Moreover, agents with intermediate match values may search indefinitely while all other agents eventually marry. We show that the share of eternal singles converges monotonically to one as search frictions vanish. Thus, improvements in search technology may backfire and even lead to market failure.