Tractable Model of Dynamic Many-to-Many Matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peski, Marcin
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190296
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1-43
• 关键词: marriage; EXISTENCE

摘要

We develop a tractable, dynamic, and strategic model of many-to-many matching with payoff externalities across links. The joint dynamic surplus or certain second properties of individual utilities, like pay-off externalities, can typically be identified. We characterize a class of interior equilibria as solutions to an optimization problem with an objective function that consists of welfare minus an inefficiency loss term. In equilibrium, too few matches are formed. We compare trans-ferable and nontransferable versions of the model; the equilibria of the two versions are equivalent up to a rescaling of parame-ters. We describe the asymptotic limits of disappearing frictions.