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作者：Friberg, Richard; Steen, Frode; Ulsaker, Simen A.
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This paper examines the effect of cross-border shopping on grocery demand in Norway using monthly store x category sales data from Norway's largest grocery chain 2012-2016. The sensitivity of demand to the foreign price is hump-shaped and greatest 30-60 minutes' driving distance from the closest foreign store. Combining continuous demand, fixed costs of cross-border shopping, and linear transport costs a la Hotelling, we show how this hump shape can arise through a combination of intensive and...
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作者：Denter, Philipp; Morgan, John; Sisak, Dana
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：We analyze the incentives for showing off , which we model as a costly signaling game , and study the consequences of norms against such behavior. Prior to competing in a contest , a newcomer can signal his talent to an incumbent. In equilibrium , costly signaling of ability occurs only when the newcomer is exceptionally talented. In such situations signaling benefits both contestants: the newcomer for obvious reasons; the incumbent by economizing on wasted effort in the contest. Our results r...
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作者：Dreyfuss, Bnaya; Heffetz, Ori; Rabin, Matthew
作者单位：Harvard University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：Deferred acceptance (DA), a widely implemented algorithm, is meant to improve allocations: under classical preferences, it induces preference-concordant rankings. However, recent evidence shows that-in both real, large-stakes applications and experiments -par-ticipants frequently play seemingly dominated, significantly costly strategies that avoid small chances of good outcomes. We show the-oretically why, with expectations-based loss aversion, this behavior may be partly intentional. Reanalyz...
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作者：Thiel, Jurre H.
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：To prevent biased advice, regulators increasingly ban commission payments to financial advisers. Such bans are associated with advice gaps, meaning that advice becomes less accessible. To understand the trade-off between the quality and accessibility of advice, this paper develops a model of price competition in advice markets with endogenous entry of advisers. While commission bans increase consumer surplus in the short run, they hurt the profitability of advisers. In the long run, advisers e...
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作者：Kim, Jeongbin; Palfrey, Thomas R.; Zeidel, Jeffrey R.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We develop a general framework for analyzing games where each player is a team and members of the same team all receive the same payoff. The framework combines noncooperative game theory with collective choice theory, and is developed for both strategic form and extensive form games. We introduce the concept of team equilibrium and identify conditions under which it converges to Nash equilibrium with large teams. We identify conditions on collective choice rules such that team decisions are st...
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作者：Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Peking University
摘要：We consider a two-stage contest, in which only a subset of contestants enters the finale. We explore the optimal policy for disclosing con-testants' interim status after the preliminary round, i.e., their interim ranking and elimination decision. The optimum depends on the design objective. We fully characterize the conditions under which disclo-sure or concealment emerges as the optimum. We further allow the organizer to bias the competition based on finalists' interim rankings, which endogen...
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作者：Diasakos, Theodoros M.; Gerasimou, Georgios
作者单位：University of Stirling; University of St Andrews
摘要：It is frequently assumed in several domains of economics that demand functions are invertible in prices. At the primitive level of preferences, however, the corresponding characterization has remained elusive. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions on a utility-maximizing consumer's preferences for her demand function to be continuous and invertible: strict convexity, strict monotonicity, and differentiability in the sense of Rubinstein (2006). We further show that Rubinstein differen...
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作者：Gradwohl, Ronen; Hahn, Niklas; Hoefer, Martin; Smorodinsky, Rann
作者单位：Ariel University; Goethe University Frankfurt; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper, we study a setting with multiple senders in which the receiver is restricted to choosing, at the interim stage, one sender with whom to interact. Our main result is that whenever senders are uncertain about each other's prefer-ences and, in particular, cannot d...
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作者：Yamashita, Takuro; Zhu, Shuguang
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper considers an interdependent-value robust mechanism design problem, where the principal has little knowledge about the agent's belief. Although ex post incentive-compatible (EPIC) mechanisms can implement allocations without any knowledge about the agent's belief, we show that, under a certain condition (order-reversing interdependence), there exists a non-EPIC mecha-nism that achieves a strictly higher expected revenue than any EPIC mechanism given whatever (admissible) belief struc...
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作者：Bac, Mehmet
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：How should law enforcement resources be allocated to minimize the harms from flexible, chain-form trafficking organizations? I show that optimal interventions focus on one target, the feeding source (decap-itation) or the revenue-generating tail (amputation). Decapitation dismantles the crime chain under large budgets but induces maxi-mal expansion otherwise, whereas amputation generates a rich set of detection outcomes and limits the chain's size response. A rule of thumb emerges for authorit...
