Acquisition, Aggregation, and Sharing of Information in Sequential-Move Aggregative Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cumbul, Eray
• 署名单位: TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190059
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 441-479
• 关键词: social value; resource dilemmas; asymmetric information; private information; Cournot oligopoly; supply chain; public-goods; Stackelberg; COORDINATION; uncertainty

摘要

We study quadratic payoff common-value sequential-move aggregative games with signaling. Applications include Stackelberg quantity-setting, public good contribution, common resource, gas emission, and manufacturer-retailer games. Whereas efficient aggregation of information occurs in large Stackelberg markets, it does not occur in the four remaining large markets. If all agents share their information with their followers, expected welfare increases in the Stackelberg and supply chain games and it decreases in the remaining three games. Finally, we characterize the conditions for payoffs and welfare to increase with more precise private or public information. We also provide robustness checks when the values are private.