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作者：Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose L.; Sun, Yajie
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Tinbergen Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Navarra
摘要：An increase in quality shifts up the distribution of match utilities offered by firms and makes consumers pickier. The number of prod-ucts that consumers inspect does not necessarily increase in qual-ity. Higher search costs may lead to less quality investment, and the equilibrium price may decrease. If the equilibrium is inefficient , it is because of the inadequacy of quality investment. The market level of quality investment is excessive (insufficient) and consumers are too (little) picky f...
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作者：Kolb, Aaron; Pease, Marilyn; Sacks, Daniel W.; Quick, Joshua
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We develop and test a theory of blind disclosure. A sender chooses whether to disclose information based on a preliminary, private sig-nal. In the unique equilibrium, contrary to the literature's canonical unraveling result, senders disclose only if their preliminary signal exceeds a cutoff. This cutoff rule leads to partial unraveling in envi-ronments with either risk aversion or moral hazard, and disclo-sure decreases with uncertainty. Using unique administrative data on disclosed and undisc...
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作者：Arifovic, Jasmina; Hommes, Cars; Kopanyi-Peuker, Anita; Salle, Isabelle
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Bank of Canada; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Radboud University Nijmegen; University of Ottawa
摘要：We provide experimental evidence on coordination within large groups that could proxy the atomistic nature of real-world mar-kets. We use a bank run game where the two pure-strategy equilib-ria can be ranked by payoff and risk dominance and a sequence of public announcements introduces stochastic sunspot equilibria. We find systematic group size effects that theory fails to predict. When the payoff-dominant strategy is risky enough, the behavior of small groups is uninformative of the behavior...
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作者：Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H.
作者单位：University of Iowa; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (i) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (ii) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This...
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作者：Nguyen, Anh; Tan, Teck Yong
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：We study bilateral trade with a seller owning multiple units of a good, where each unit is of binary quality. The seller privately knows her type-defined by the number of lemons that she owns- and which units in her endowments are the lemons (within-type adverse selection). We characterize the set of informationally constrained Pareto optimal allocations and show that every such allocation must involve a trade characterized by a threshold lambda*, with types having less (more) than lambda* uni...
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作者：Roger, Guillaume; Julien, Benoit
作者单位：Monash University
摘要：Principals seek to trade with homogeneous agents by posting incen-tive contracts, which direct their search. Search and moral hazard interact in equilibrium. If using transfers to compensate agents fail-ing to contract, the equilibrium allocation is always constrained -wel-fare-optimal in contrast to the one-to-one principal-agent problem. Search frictions thus correct that inefficiency because search requires internalizing the utility of agents. Incentives are weaker than in bilat-eral contra...
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作者：Kim, Harim
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：Industry-wide shocks can have heterogeneous impacts on firms' costs due to different firm characteristics. The heterogeneity of these impacts is crucial for understanding the pass-through of the shock because of its implications for strategic competition. In the context of the gas price shock in the electricity market, I develop a method to identify the heterogeneous impacts of the shock and show, with a structural analysis, that the heterogeneous feature of the shock induces markup adjustment...
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作者：Barbosa, K. L. E. N. I. O.; De Silva, Dakshina g.; Yang, L. I. Y. U.; Yoshimoto, H. I. S. A. Y. U. K. I.
作者单位：Universite Cote d'Azur; SKEMA Business School; Lancaster University; Nanjing Audit University; University of Glasgow
摘要：This paper exploits a large-scale auction experiment conducted by two Chinese government treasury security issuers-the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank-to investigate whether treasury securities should be sold through uniform price or discriminatory price auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically differen...
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作者：LIu, Bin; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; National University of Singapore
摘要：Due to the well-known efficiency-rent extraction trade-off, the optimal mechanism in a pure screening environment (e.g., rev-enue maximization in auctions or cost minimization in procure-ment) typically calls for distortions in allocative efficiency when agents possess private information at the time of contracting. In this paper we introduce first-stage type-enhancing hidden invest-ment to a standard sequential screening model of procurement, and find that (i) with convex investment cost, mit...
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作者：MacKay, Alexander
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：The optimal duration of a supply contract balances the costs of re-selecting a supplier against the costs of being matched to an inefficient supplier when the contract lasts too long. I develop a structural model of contract duration that captures this trade-off and provide an empirical strategy for quantifying (unobserved) transaction costs. I estimate the model using federal supply contracts for a standardized product, where suppliers are selected by procurement auctions. The estimated trans...
