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作者：Mercadal, Ignacia
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：I study the effects of financial players who trade alongside physical buyers and sellers in electricity markets. Using detailed firm-level data, I examine physical and financial firrns' responses to regulation that exogenously increased financial trading. I show that the effect of speculators on generators' market power depends on the kind of equilibrium they are in. I develop a test of the null of static Nash equilibrium and reject it. To implement the test, I present a new method to define m...
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作者：Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：Chung, Glimcher, and Tymula (2019) observed both consumers' choices over commodity bundles and choices under risk. They assumed a cardinal riskless utility function V representing consumer choices and a cardinal risky utility function U. The two were inconsistent. This note shows that the two functions can be reconciled if we assume that V is ordinal. Then one utility function U can accommodate both risky and riskless choices.
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作者：Hernandez, Penelope; Neeman, Zvika
作者单位：University of Valencia; University of Valencia; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider the question of how best to allocate enforcement resources across different locations with the goal of deterring unwanted behavior. We rely on Bayesian persuasion to improve deterrence. We focus on the case where agents care only about the expected amount of enforcement resources given messages received. Optimization in the space of induced mean posterior beliefs involves a partial convexification of the objective function. We describe inter-pretable conditions under which it is po...
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作者：Bird, Daniel; Neeman, Zvika
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：A monopolistic firm observes a signal about the state of the world and then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to an uninformed consumer who has recourse to some outside option. We provide a geometric characterization of the firm's information structure that maximizes the consumer's surplus: the optimal regime partitions the space of payoff states into polyhedral cones with disjoint interiors. We inter-pret our results in terms of the maximization of the consumer's pri-vacy rent. We illustrate ...
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作者：Byrne, David P.; de Roos, Nicolas
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Sydney
摘要：Workhorse economic models used for studying the market impacts of search frictions assume constant search costs: individuals pay the same cost to obtain price information each time they search. This paper provides evidence on a new form of search costs: start-up costs. Exploiting a natural experiment in retail gasoline, we document how a temporary, large exogenous shock to consumers' search incentives leads to a substantial, permanent increase in price search. A standard search model fails to ...
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作者：Demuynck, Thomas; Seel, Christian; Tran, Giang
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Maastricht University
摘要：We develop an index of competitiveness and cooperativeness that is based on the primitives of a normal-form game, i.e., players, strate-gies and payoffs. The index relies on the unique decomposition of a given game into a zero-sum game and a common interest game. The index decreases in the distance to its zero-sum part and increases in the distance to its common interest part. The comparative statics of our index coincide with economic intuition. The index also supports experimental findings i...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Vivek; Howard, Greg
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This paper provides evidence of rational inattention by experienced professionals in strategic interactions. We add rational inattention to a game of matching pennies with state-dependent payoffs. Unlike the full-information, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, payoffs of different actions need not be equated state by state. Moreover, players respond partially to payoff differences, this responsiveness is stronger when attention costs are lower, strategies converge to full-information Nash as sta...
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作者：Ghidoni, Riccardo; Suetens, Sigrid
作者单位：University of Bologna; Tilburg University
摘要：Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that sequen-tial play reduces strategic uncertainty. We show in an experiment that this has large consequences for behavior. We find that with inter-mediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases the cooper-ation rate by arou...
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作者：Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Dubra, Juan; Romagnoli, Giorgia
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Universidad de Montevideo; University of Amsterdam
摘要：Elicitation mechanisms typically presume only money enters utility functions. However, nonmonetary objectives are confounders. In particular, psychologists argue people favor bets where ability is involved over equivalent random bets-a preference for control. Our new elicitation method mitigates control objectives and determines that under the widely used matching probabilities method, subjects report beliefs 18 percent higher than their true beliefs to increase control. Nonmonetary objectives...
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作者：Vasquez, Jorge
作者单位：Smith College
摘要：This paper develops a theory of crime in which potential victims elect their vigilance levels. When vigilance expenses are greater than expected property losses, an increase in penalties raises crime, namely, a criminal Laffer curve emerges. This curve is higher and peaks earlier when victims face higher costs. Thus, the government may wish to subsidize vigilance rather than increase penalties. Indeed, an increase in penalties may shift the vigilance levels further away from their socially opt...
