An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Muto, Nozomu; Sato, Shin
• 署名单位: Yokohama National University; Fukuoka University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.013
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1-15
• 关键词: Bounded response; strategy-proofness; Non-manipulability; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

摘要

We introduce a new axiom called bounded response, which states that for each smallest change of a preference profile, the change in the social choice must be smallest, if any, for the agent who induces the change in the preference profile. We show that bounded response is weaker than strategy-proofness, and that bounded response and efficiency imply dictatorship. This impossibility has a far-reaching negative implication: on the universal domain of preferences, it is difficult to identify a non-manipulability condition that leads to a possibility result. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.