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作者：Marden, Jason R.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：A learning rule is completely uncoupled if each player's behavior is conditioned only on his own realized payoffs, and does not need to know the actions or payoffs of anyone else. We demonstrate a simple, completely uncoupled learning rule such that, in any finite normal form game with generic payoffs, the players' realized strategies implements a socially optimal coarse correlated (Hannan) equilibrium a very high proportion of the time. That is, the empirical frequency associated with the pla...
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作者：Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Poulsen, Anders U.; Roos, Michael W. M.
作者单位：University of Portsmouth; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia; Ruhr University Bochum
摘要：We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated in real time. We test hypotheses about the interaction between the focal properties of payoffs and the complexity of coordinating on an intertemporal behavior that achieves them. The general finding is that when a payoff focal outcome requires a complicated coordination scheme bargainers tend to settle on a simpler and sometimes inefficient behavior. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Piermont, Evan
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：This paper explores the behavior of a decision maker (DM) who is unaware of some of the options available to her. The DM has a preference over consumption alternatives that is informed by her epistemic state: what she knows and what she is aware of. The main result is a characterization, via observable choice, of introspective unawareness a DM who is both unaware of some information and aware she is unaware. Under dynamic introspective unawareness, the DM is unwilling to commit to future choic...
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作者：Huang, Chao; Tian, Guoqiang
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：In the assignment problem where agents can stay unassigned, the size of the assignment is an important consideration for designers. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2015) show that there is a tension between size and fairness: the guaranteed size ratio of any envy-free mechanism is at most r(m), which converges decreasingly to 1 - 1/e approximate to 63.2% as the maximum size increases. They then ask whether r(m) is also the guaranteed size ratio for any ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanism. We s...
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作者：Brandl, Florian
作者单位：Technical University of Munich
摘要：Given a skew-symmetric matrix, the corresponding two-player symmetric zero-sum game is defined as follows: one player, the row player, chooses a row and the other player, the column player, chooses a column. The payoff of the row player is given by the corresponding matrix entry, the column player receives the negative of the row player. A randomized strategy is optimal if it guarantees an expected payoff of at least 0 for a player independently of the strategy of the other player. We determin...
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作者：Laslier, Jean-Francois; Nunez, Matias; Pimienta, Carlos
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Information Sciences & Technologies (INS2I); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：In the Approval Bargaining game, two players bargain over a finite set of alternatives. To this end, each one simultaneously submits a utility function u jointly with a real number a; by doing so she approves the lotteries whose expected utility according to u is at least a. The lottery to be implemented is randomly selected among the most approved ones. We first prove that there is an equilibrium where players truthfully reveal their utility function. We also show that, in any equilibrium, th...
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作者：Martin, Daniel
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Using a standard strategic pricing game, I determine how sellers set prices when facing buyers who are rationally inattentive to information about product quality. Two cases are studied: strategically sophisticated buyers who are rationally inattentive to exogenous information about quality and strategically naive buyers who are rationally inattentive to strategic information about quality. In both cases, there exists an equilibrium where high quality sellers price high and low quality sellers...
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作者：Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer-seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes; moreover, in contrast to results for the setting of many to -one matching with contracts, if any agent's preferences are not substitutable, then the existence of a stable outcome can not be guaranteed. In ma...
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作者：Cooper, Kristen B.; Schneider, Henry S.; Waldman, Michael
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Cornell University
摘要：The psychology and behavioral economics literatures show that real world decision making at the individual level is frequently inconsistent with the rational actor model. An important question is therefore the extent to which a proportion of agents who make mistakes affects market level outcomes. Previous theoretical and experimental research showed that market level outcomes are less likely to match the rational actor model in settings characterized by strategic complementarity and more likel...
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作者：Kumano, Taro
作者单位：Yokohama National University
摘要：In this study, we consider priority-based matching problems in which indifferent priorities are allowed. Although indifferences in priorities are naturally present in practice, it is unknown whether constrained efficient stable matchings are implementable in any strategic solution concept. Therefore, in this study, we show that (1) stable matchings are Nash implementable via a practical mechanism and (2) constrained efficient stable matchings are Nash implementable if and only if priorities sa...
