Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gelder, Alan; Kovenock, Dan
• 署名单位: Chapman University System; Chapman University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.008
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 444-455
• 关键词: Dynamic contest; Multi-battle contest; Player type; experiment; all-pay auction; escalation; Last stand; Maximin

摘要

In a dynamic contest where it is costly to compete, a player who is behind must decide whether to surrender or keep fighting in the face of bleak odds. We experimentally examine the game theoretic prediction of last stand behavior in a multi-battle contest with a winning prize and losing penalty, as well as the contrasting prediction of surrendering in the corresponding contest with no penalty. We find varied evidence in support of these hypotheses in the aggregate data, but more conclusive evidence when scrutinizing individual player behavior. Players' realized strategies tend to conform to one of several types. We develop a taxonomy to classify player types and study how types interact and how their incidence varies across treatments. Although last stand and surrendering behaviors arise at rates responsive to the importance of losing penalties, the most prominent behavior is escalation. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.