Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.002
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 56-68
• 关键词: Many-to-one matching; matching with contracts; Unilateral substitutability; Substitutable completability

摘要

We prove that the unilateral substitutability property introduced in Hatfield and Kojima (2010) implies the substitutable completability property from Hatfield and Kominers (2014). This paper provides a novel linkage between these two sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable matching in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. A substitutable completion of a preference is a substitutable preference created by adding some sets of contracts to the original preference order. We provide an algorithm which when operated on the unilaterally substitutable preferences produces such a substitutable completion. Thus it provides a constructive proof of the connection between the two properties. (c) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.