Auctions with selective entry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gentry, Matthew; Li, Tong; Lu, Jingfeng
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Vanderbilt University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.016
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 104-111
• 关键词: Auctions; Endogenous participation; mechanism design

摘要

We consider auctions with entry based on a general analytical framework we call the Arbitrarily Selective (AS) model. We characterize symmetric equilibrium in a broad class of standard auctions within this framework, in the process extending the classic revenue equivalence results of Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) to environments with endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry. We also explore the relationship between revenue maximization and efficiency, showing that a revenue maximizing seller will typically employ both higher-than-efficient reservation prices and higher-than-efficient entry fees. (C) 2017 Published by Elsevier Inc.