Promises and expectations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ederer, Florian; Stremitzer, Alexander
• 署名单位: Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.012
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 161-178
• 关键词: promises; expectations; beliefs; CONTRACTS; Guilt aversion

摘要

We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational effects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we show that exogenous variation of second-order expectations (promisors' expectations about promisees' expectations) leads to a significant change in promisor behavior. We provide evidence that a promisor's aversion to disappointing a promisee's expectation leads her to behave more generously. We propose and estimate a simple model of conditional guilt aversion that is supported by our results and nests the findings of previous contributions as special cases. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.