Balanced ranking mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Long, Yan; Mishra, Debasis; Sharma, Tridib
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.002
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 9-39
• 关键词: Budget-balanced mechanisms; Green-Laffont mechanism; Pareto optimal mechanism

摘要

In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. The mechanism converges to efficiency at an exponential rate. It allocates the object to the highest valued agent with more than 99% probability provided there are at least 14 agents. It is also ex-post individually rational. We show that our mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of satisfactory ranking mechanisms. Since achieving efficiency through a dominant strategy incentive compatible and budget-balanced mechanism is impossible in this model, our results illustrate the limits of this impossibility. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.