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作者：Bravo, Mario; Mertikopoulos, Panayotis
作者单位：Universidad de Santiago de Chile; Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and random disturbances. First, in the single-player case (corresponding to an agent trying to adapt to an arbitrarily changing environment), we show that the stochastic dynamics under study lead to no regret almost surely, irrespective of the noise level in the play...
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作者：Chun, Youngsub; Yengin, Duygu
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); University of Adelaide
摘要：We investigate the implications of welfare lower bounds together with queue-efficiency and strategy-proofness in the context of the queueing problem. First, we introduce the k-welfare lower bound, which requires that each agent should be guaranteed her utility at the kth queue position with zero transfer. For each k, we show that the k-pivotal rules (Mitra and Mutuswami, 2011) achieve the minimal deficit in each problem among all rules satisfying queue-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and the k...
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作者：Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Tvede, Mich; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Newcastle; Copenhagen Business School
摘要：We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue 'bubbles up' in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of pop...
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作者：Nicolo, Antonio; Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo
作者单位：University of Padua; University of Manchester; Complutense University of Madrid
摘要：We consider a Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) model in which patients' preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger donors to kidneys from older ones. We propose a family of rules, sequential priority rules, that only allow for pairwise exchanges and satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. These rules allocate kidneys according to a priority algorithm that gives priority to patients with younger donors and assign kid...
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作者：Siegenthaler, Simon
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：We report on an experiment on decentralized markets in the presence of adverse selection. When allowing for costless and non-binding communication (cheap-talk), there exists a partially separating equilibrium that results in a substantially higher efficiency level than the adverse selection benchmark. The partially separating equilibrium hinges on the presence of matching frictions, which create a trade-off for low quality sellers between successfully mimicking high quality sellers and an incr...
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作者：Kopanyi-Peuker, Anita; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：We consider the possibility that cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma is fostered by people's voluntary enhancement of their own vulnerability. The vulnerability of a player determines the effectiveness of possible punishment by the other. In the Gradual mechanism, players may condition their incremental enhancements of their vulnerability on the other's choices. In the Leap mechanism, they unconditionally choose their vulnerability. In our experiment, subjects only learn to cooperate when eith...
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作者：Page, Lionel; Siemroth, Christoph
作者单位：Queensland University of Technology (QUT); University of Essex
摘要：We study which factors in terms of trading environment and trader characteristics determine individual information acquisition in experimental asset markets. Traders with larger endowments, existing inconclusive information, lower risk aversion, and less experience in financial markets tend to acquire more information. Overall, we find that traders overacquire information, so that informed traders on average obtain negative profits net of information costs. Information acquisition and the asso...
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作者：Anbarci, Nejat; Ghosh, Saptarshi R.; Roy, Jaideep
作者单位：Deakin University; Shiv Nadar University; University of Bath
摘要：An evaluator estimates as precisely as possible the innate talent of a careerist expert by observing the expert's performance in a prediction task, and has the ability to interfere with the expert's private signal by affecting its precision. The expert on the other hand knows her talent, observes this interference and can misrepresent private beliefs through strategic predictions to enhance her reputation. We show that when priors are significantly uninformative so that the task is a priori ha...
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作者：Seel, Christian; Tsakas, Elias
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：Games in which players aim to guess a fraction or multiple p of the average guess are known as guessing games or (p -)beauty contests. In this note, we derive a full characterization of the set of rationalizable strategies and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for such games as a function of the parameter p, the number of players and the (discrete) set of available guesses to each player. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Vong, Allen I. K.
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：I consider the strategic manipulation problem in multistage tournaments. In each stage, players are sorted into groups in which they play pairwise matches against each other. The match results induce a ranking over players in each group, and higher ranked players qualify to the next stage. Players prefer qualifying to higher stages. In this setting, a player may potentially profit by exerting zero effort in some matches even when effort exertion is costless. Since such behavior manipulates the...
