Political institutions and the evolution of character traits

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wu, Jiabin
• 署名单位: University of Oregon
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.011
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 260-276
• 关键词: Evolution of character traits; political institutions; evolutionary game theory

摘要

This paper argues that political institutions play an important role in influencing the evolution of character traits. We consider a population with two groups each with different character traits. A political institution provides the platform and a set of rules for the two groups to battle over the relative representativeness of their traits for the high positions in the social hierarchy. This political process affects the economic outcomes of the two groups and, subsequently their character traits evolve. We study how conducive different political institutions are to spreading character traits that induce better economic outcomes. Under exclusive political institutions, any trait can be prevalent. Therefore, a society can be trapped in a state in which traits associated with unfavorable economic outcomes persist. Under inclusive political institutions, evolution has stronger selection power. Only traits that result in the largest comparative advantage in terms of holding a high position can be prevalent. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.