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作者：Kayaba, Yutaka; Matsushima, Hitoshi; Toyama, Tomohisa
作者单位：University of Tokyo; International Christian University
摘要：We experimentally examine repeated prisoner's dilemma with random termination, in which monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of the subjects follows generous tit-for-tat strategies, which are stochastic extensions of tit-for-tat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the generous tit-for-tat equilibrium behavior. Showing inconsistent behavior, subjects with low accuracy do not tend to retaliate more than those wi...
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作者：Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We establish existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games that have a continuous and concave potential at all states of nature, without assuming absolute continuity of information. As an application, we show that Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in many well-known games that have semi-quadratic payoffs (including Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies with linear demand), for general information structures. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Garcia-Pola, Bernardo; Iriberri, Nagore; Kovarik, Jaromir
作者单位：University of Basque Country; Basque Foundation for Science; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：Centipede games represent a classic example of a strategic situation, where the equilibrium prediction is at odds with human behavior. This study is explicitly designed to discriminate among the proposed explanations for initial responses in centipede games. Using many different centipede games, our approach determines endogenously whether one or more explanations are empirically relevant. We find that non-equilibrium behavior is too heterogeneous to be explained by a single model. However, mo...
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作者：Shafer, Rachel C.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Bowling Green State University
摘要：This paper studies minimax regret traders in a sealed bid double auction. Unlike the expected utility maximizers that populate typical market models, these traders do not determine their actions using a single prior. The analysis proves that, with no restrictions on beliefs about others' types and strategies, minimax regret traders will not converge to price-taking as the size of the market increases, contrary to standard economic intuition. In fact, minimax regret traders' bids and asks are i...
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作者：Wu, Qingyun
作者单位：Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要：This note reveals a characteristic of stable matchings in the college admissions problem and provides structural insights and a unified treatment for several results on entering classes in this model, including the famous Rural Hospital Theorem. We also show that the worst student determines the entire entering class. (c) 2020 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Bilancini, Ennio; Boncinelli, Leonardo; Newton, Jonathan
作者单位：IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca; University of Florence; Kyoto University
摘要：This paper considers the marriage problem under dynamic rematching. It is shown that if players who obtain higher payoffs are less likely to experiment with non-best response behavior, then matchings selected in the long run will belong to the set of Rawlsian stable matchings - the set of stable matchings which maximize the payoff of the worst off player. Conversely, alternative behavioral rules will fail to select Rawlsian stable matchings in some environments. This constitutes an evolutionar...
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作者：Schlegel, Jan Christoph
作者单位：City St Georges, University of London
摘要：We study conditions for the existence of stable and (group)-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that equivalence, properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and (group)-strategy-proof mechanism. Our result can be interpreted as a (weak) embedding result f...
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作者：Wu, Binzhen; Zhong, Xiaohan
作者单位：Tsinghua University; Tsinghua University
摘要：We examine matching inequality in students' matching outcomes for the Boston Mechanism in a large matching system, by measuring the degree of mismatch for each student. We link a student's mismatch with her reporting behavior of the first choice on her preference list to explore the reasons for matching inequality. Using administrative data from college admissions in China, we find significant gender differences, rural-urban gaps, and ethnic gaps in mismatching and first-choice behavior. These...
