Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schlegel, Jan Christoph
• 署名单位: City St Georges, University of London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.005
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 41-53
• 关键词: Matching with contracts; College admission; substitutes; Observable substitutes; strategy-proofness; deferred acceptance

摘要

We study conditions for the existence of stable and (group)-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that equivalence, properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and (group)-strategy-proof mechanism. Our result can be interpreted as a (weak) embedding result for choice functions under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.