Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wu, Binzhen; Zhong, Xiaohan
• 署名单位: Tsinghua University; Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.007
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1-21
• 关键词: Chinese college admissions; boston mechanism; Matching inequality; strategic behavior; mismatch

摘要

We examine matching inequality in students' matching outcomes for the Boston Mechanism in a large matching system, by measuring the degree of mismatch for each student. We link a student's mismatch with her reporting behavior of the first choice on her preference list to explore the reasons for matching inequality. Using administrative data from college admissions in China, we find significant gender differences, rural-urban gaps, and ethnic gaps in mismatching and first-choice behavior. These demographic differences exhibit various patterns and may be explained by risk aversion, information disadvantage, and minority-preferential admissions policies, respectively. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.