Entering classes in the college admissions model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wu, Qingyun
• 署名单位: Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.003
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 579-587
• 关键词: Stable matchings; college admissions; Entering classes; lattice; rotation

摘要

This note reveals a characteristic of stable matchings in the college admissions problem and provides structural insights and a unified treatment for several results on entering classes in this model, including the famous Rural Hospital Theorem. We also show that the worst student determines the entire entering class. (c) 2020 Published by Elsevier Inc.