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作者：Zhang, Hanzhe
作者单位：Michigan State University
摘要：This paper investigates pre-matching gambles and provides a new reason to gamble: matching concerns. Examples of pre-matching gambles include occupational choices before the marriage market, college major choices before the labor market, and portfolio management before attracting future clients in the financial market. I show that people make risky investments they would not have made if not for their subsequent participation in a competitive matching market. A fundamental and unique feature o...
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作者：Yu, Jingsheng; Zhang, Jun
作者单位：Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Nanjing Audit University
摘要：Organizations often rotate employees' jobs. This paper proposes a market design approach to organize job rotation. In our model each employee has occupied a position, and if any employee wants to move to another position, the current occupier must leave the position. This requirement is described by a priority structure in which each employee has the lowest priority for his position and others have the equal priority. It is the opposite to the famous housing market priority structure in which ...
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作者：Li, Jin; Powell, Michael
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Northwestern University
摘要：In an environment subject to random fluctuations, when does an increase in the breadth of activities in which individuals interact together help foster collaboration on each activity? We show that when players, on average, prefer to stick to a cooperative agreement rather than reneging by taking their privately optimal action, then such an agreement can be approximated as equilibrium play in a sufficiently broad relationship. This is in contrast to existing results showing that a cooperative a...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Niedermayer, Andras
作者单位：University of Melbourne; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We provide a model in which an intermediary can choose between wholesale or agency. The possibility that buyers and sellers transact directly limits his market power and, thus, creates incentives for him to deter the emergence of bilateral exchanges. In equilibrium, the intermediary chooses agency and thereby pre-empts the emergence of a competing bilateral exchange if the matching technology of the competing exchange is sufficiently efficient. For symmetric Pareto distributions, whenever agen...
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作者：Ziegler, Gabriel; Zuazo-Garin, Peio
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Basque Country
摘要：Economic predictions often hinge on two intuitive premises: agents rule out the possibility of others choosing unreasonable strategies ('strategic reasoning'), and prefer strategies that hedge against unexpected behavior ('cautiousness'). These two premises conflict and this undermines the compatibility of usual economic predictions with reasoning-based foundations. This paper proposes a new take on this classical tension by interpreting cautiousness as robustness to ambiguity. We formalize th...
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作者：Schlegel, Jan Christoph; Mamageishvili, Akaki
作者单位：City St Georges, University of London; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We introduce new notions of priority-constrained efficiency and provide priority-constrained versions of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for school choice lotteries. Moreover, we show that a priority-constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold, but can be restored for a relaxed notion of equilibrium with priority-specific prices. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Abbink, Klaus; Ryvkin, Dmitry; Serra, Danila
作者单位：Monash University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We employ laboratory experiments to examine the effects of corrupt law enforcement on crime. We embed corruption in a social dilemma where citizens choose whether to obey the law or to break the law and impose a negative externality on others. Police officers observe citizens' behavior and can impose fines on law-breakers or extort bribes from any citizen. We find that the presence of police, even if they are corrupt, substantially reduces crime as compared to a baseline setting without police...
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作者：Schwerter, Frederik; Zimmermann, Florian
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：Social interactions pervade daily life and thereby create an abundance of social experiences. Such personal experiences likely shape what we believe and who we are. In this paper, we ask if and how personal experiences from social interactions determine individuals' inclination to trust others? In a laboratory experiment, we manipulate social experiences prior to measuring participants' willingness to trust others. We contrast this situation with a non-social control condition where we keep al...
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作者：Amador, Manuel; Bagwell, Kyle
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Stanford University
摘要：This paper uses a Lagrangian approach to provide sufficient conditions under which money burning expenditures are used in an optimal delegation contract. For comparison, we also establish simple sufficient conditions for the optimality of a cap allocation under a restricted set of preferences for a benchmark setting in which money burning is not allowed. We also apply our findings to a model of cooperation and to a model with quadratic preferences and families of distribution functions. In add...
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作者：Chaturvedi, Rakesh
作者单位：Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi
摘要：A holdout problem arises in a land assembly environment in which one buyer is interested in a large landmass characterized by fragmented ownership among many landowners. A simple holdout-resolving mechanism is obtained that asymptotically (as the number of landowners increase) solves a mechanism design problem with two novel criteria. One, a partial coercion constraint that respects property rights only in an 'aggregate' sense; and two, a fairness constraint that requires the terms of trade (p...
