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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
作者单位：University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We develop a graphical, non-analytical version of the two-person beauty contest game to study the developmental trajectory of instinctive behavior and learning from kindergarten to adulthood. These are captured by observing behavior when the game is played in two consecutive trials. We find that equilibrium behavior in the first trial increases significantly between 5 and 10 years of age (from 17.9% to 61.4%) and stabilizes afterwards. Children of all ages learn to play the equilibrium, especi...
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作者：Negrelli, Sara
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：Recent empirical studies suggest that, during times of unexpected innovation, agents heterogeneously update their beliefs about an asset fundamental value and are uncertain of other agents' beliefs about it. In this paper I show that, when there is uncertainty over the market sentiment - defined as other investors' beliefs about an asset fundamental value - market manipulation can act through a previously unconsidered channel, by misleading agents' learning on the market sentiment. This novel ...
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作者：Aziz, Haris; Chan, Hau; Lee, Barton E.; Parkes, David C.
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO); University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln; Harvard University
摘要：We initiate the study of the capacity constrained facility location problem from a mechanism design perspective. In the capacity constrained setting, the facility can serve only a subset of the population, assumed to be the k-closest with respect to agents' true locations (this can be justified as the essentially unique equilibrium outcome of a first-come-first game induced by the facility location). The main result is a complete characterization of dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DIC)...
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作者：Chen, Yin; Dang, Chuangyin
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：As a strict refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of perfect equilibrium was formulated and extensively studied in the literature. To determine perfect equilibrium, this paper extends the logistic version of quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) to a perturbed game. As a result of this extension, a smooth path is constructed for determining perfect equilibrium. The path starts from an arbitrary totally mixed strategy profile and leads to a perfect equilibrium. Numerical examples show ...
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作者：Donna, Javier D.; Schenone, Pablo; Veramendi, Gregory F.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Fordham University; University of Munich
摘要：This article uses networks to study price dispersion in seller-buyer markets where buyers with unit demand interact with multiple, but not all, sellers; and buyers and sellers compete on prices after they meet. The central finding of this article is that price dispersion is determined by the structure of the network. First, for any given network we characterize the pairwise stable matchings and the prices that support them. Second, we characterize the set of all graphs where price dispersion i...
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作者：Ging-Jehli, Nadja R.; Schneider, Florian H.; Weber, Roberto A.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Zurich
摘要：We experimentally study whether individuals adopt negative beliefs about others' intentions to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study compares the beliefs held by players with such an incentive to the beliefs of neutral observers and finds no evidence that individuals engage in strategic cynicism. This contrasts with other recent evidence demonstrating that people hold less positive beliefs about others when doing so allows them to act more self-interestedly. We reconcile the discrepancy, ...
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作者：Petri, Henrik
作者单位：University of Bath
摘要：We characterize lexicographic conditional probability systems (LCPSs). Our aim is to address an issue left open in an important contribution by Blume et al. (1991a). They provide a characterization of LCPSs, but one of their axioms quite explicitly imposes disjointness of the supports in an LCPS. The main new axiom is robustness, which is a weak continuity requirement on preferences. It requires preferences between acts x and y to be robust to (unchanged by) small perturbations in payoffs x(om...
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作者：Sanchez-Pages, Santiago
作者单位：University of London; King's College London
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作者：Cao, Cangjian; Li, Sherry Xin; Liu, Tracy Xiao
作者单位：Tsinghua University; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
摘要：We conduct two field experiments to investigate whether and how different forms of monetary gifts influence workers' performance in the workplace. Temporary research assistants are surprised with a monetary gift after completing a pre-announced task and decide whether to work on an additional one. We find in both experiments that the impact of gift type on workers' productivity is contingent on the gift amount. Specifically, for the larger but not the smaller gift amount, a more thoughtful pre...
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作者：Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frederic
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We use the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005) to study cheap talk from a sender who does not perfectly understand all the messages available to him. The sender is endowed with a privately known language competence corresponding to the set of messages that he understands. For the messages that he does not understand, the sender has correct but only coarse expectations about the equilibrium response of the receiver. An analogy-based expectation equilibrium is always a Bayesian ...
