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作者：Banerjee, Ritwik; Gupta, Nabanita Datta; Villeval, Marie Claire
作者单位：Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Bangalore; Aarhus University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Does feedback on success in a task increase individuals' beliefs about their chance to succeed in a subsequent, unrelated, task? Does feedback on failure have a symmetric effect? Is the distortion of beliefs, possibly due to motivated beliefs, mistakes in updating or the feeling of having a lucky day, heterogeneous across individuals, in particular according to their status in the society? Conducting an artefactual field experiment in India with participants from different castes, we show that...
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作者：Knudson, Mathew
摘要：In the classical spatial model of two candidate competition, an equilibrium exists only if the distribution of voter ideal points is such that every median hyperplane passes through a single policy. The necessity of this condition crucially depends upon both candidates being able to propose any policy in a Euclidean space. We assume that each candidate is affiliated with a party which restricts the policies that its candidate can propose and that voters have Euclidean spatial preferences. We s...
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作者：Stovall, John E.
摘要：We axiomatically characterize the family of equal sacrifice rules for the problem of fair taxation: every agent with positive post-tax income sacrifices the same amount of utility relative to his/her respective pre-tax income. In contrast to the result in Young (1988), our family of rules allows for asymmetric and constrained versions of equal sacrifice. When we add the requirement that an agent's tax burden must not decrease when their income increases, then this is equivalent to assuming tha...
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作者：Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：We analyze undiscounted continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with two armed bandits. The risky arm generates payoffs according to a Levy process with an unknown average payoff per unit of time which nature draws from an arbitrary finite set. Observing all actions and realized payoffs, plus a free background signal, players use Markov strategies with the common posterior belief about the unknown parameter as the state variable. We show that the unique symmetric Markov perfect equi...
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作者：Matyskova, Ludmila; Rogers, Brian; Steiner, Jakub; Sun, Keh-Kuan
作者单位：University of Bonn; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Zurich; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：When observable cues correlate with optimal choices, habit-driven behavior can alleviate cognition costs. We experimentally study the degree of sophistication in habit formation and cue selection. To this end, we compare lab treatments that differ in the information provided to subjects, holding fixed the serial correlation of optimal actions. We find that a particular cue - own past action - affects behavior only in treatments in which this habit is useful. The result suggests that caution is...
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Leonetti, Paolo; Maccheroni, Fabio
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：Two extensive game structures with imperfect information are said to be behaviorally equivalent if they share the same map (up to relabelings) from profiles of structurally reduced strategies to induced terminal paths. We show that this is the case if and only if one can be transformed into the other through a composition of two elementary transformations, commonly known as Interchanging of Simultaneous Moves and Coalescing Moves/Sequential Agent Splitting. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights re...
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作者：Szkup, Michal; Trevino, Isabel
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We study experimentally how changes in the information structure affect behavior in coordination games with incomplete information (global games). We find two systematic departures from the theory: (1) the comparative statics of equilibrium thresholds and signal precision are reversed, and (2) as information becomes very precise subjects' behavior approximates the efficient equilibrium of the game, not the risk dominant one. We hypothesize that sentiments in the perception of strategic uncerta...
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作者：Andina-Diaz, Ascension; Garcia-Martinez, Jose A.
作者单位：Universidad de Malaga; Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche
摘要：This paper proposes a new argument to explain why media firms silence information and why this behavior may vary across firms and market structures. We build on the literature of career concerns and consider firms that seek to maximize their reputation for high quality. Crucial to our results is the idea that media firms' reporting strategies affect the probability that consumers learn the state of the world. We show that reputational concerns introduce an incentive for firms to withhold scoop...
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作者：Ewerhart, Christian; Valkanova, Kremena
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Zurich
摘要：This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/tau, regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-person zero-sum games with bilinear payoff functions do not possess the continuous-time fictitious-play property. As extensions, we consider networks in which each bilateral game i...
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作者：Kwiek, Maksymilian
作者单位：University of Southampton
摘要：A model of communication with two features is presented: inattentive receivers, who are heterogeneous in their inattention, and the intermediaries, whose preferences are not aligned with each other or with the preferences of the initial sender. The sender faces a dilemma how to shape her message to maneuver the intermediaries into telling the final receivers what she considers important. A sincere communication policy and competition between the intermediaries are optimal if three conditions h...
