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作者：d'Adda, Giovanna; Dufwenberg, Martin; Passarelli, Francesco; Tabellini, Guido
作者单位：University of Milan; University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Turin; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We propose a simple theory of social norms that models the distinct influence on behavior of personal values, normative expectations and empirical expectations. The first and second moments of the distribution of normative expectations affect the strength of social norms' pull on behavior. We test the empirical predictions of the model through an experiment based on a variant of the dictator game. Consistent with the theory, we find that normative expectations influence generosity and that hig...
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作者：Bjorndahl, Adam; Halpern, Joseph Y.; Pass, Rafael
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Cornell University
摘要：We define Bayesian games with intentions by introducing a distinction between intended and actual actions, generalizing both Bayesian games and (static) psychological games Geanakoplos et al. (1989). We propose a new solution concept for this framework and prove that Nash equilibria in static psychological games correspond to a special class of equilibria as defined in our setting. We also show how the actual/intended divide can be used to implement the distinction between real outcomes and re...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; van den Nouweland, Anne
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Oregon
摘要：This paper analyzes farsighted stability when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying the two properties of justifiability and maximality and define stable alternatives as unique stationary points of the expectation function of some agent. We characterize stable alternatives in one-to-one matching models and voting models, and show that the relaxation of the hypothesis of common expectations greatly expands the set of states...
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作者：Fukuda, Satoshi
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper formalizes common belief among players with no underlying assumption on their individual beliefs. Especially, players may not be logically omniscient, i.e., they may not believe logical consequences of their beliefs. The key idea is to use a novel concept of a common basis: it is an event such that, whenever it is true, every player believes its logical consequences. The common belief in an event obtains when a common basis implies the mutual belief in that event. If players' belief...
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作者：Wittwer, Milena
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：I develop a framework to study common situations, in which substitute goods are sold in separate, good-specific multi-unit (pay-as-bid) auctions. I characterize bidding behavior and investigate auction design features that could increase revenues. The setting I develop gives rise to an essentially unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which bidders shade their bids more strongly when goods are close substitutes. To increase revenues, the seller can offer total supply quantities that are (stocha...
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作者：Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz, F.; Rafels, Carlos; Ybern, Neus
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona; Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
摘要：We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martinez-de-Albeniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core point...
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作者：Mohlin, Erik; Ostling, Robert; Wang, Joseph Tao-yi
作者单位：Lund University; Stockholm School of Economics; National Taiwan University
摘要：We study a simple model of similarity-based global cumulative imitation in symmetric games with large and ordered strategy sets and a salient winning player. We show that the learning model explains behavior well in both field and laboratory data from one such winner-takes-all game: the lowest unique positive integer game in which the player that chose the lowest number not chosen by anyone else wins a fixed prize. We corroborate this finding in three other winner-takes-all games and discuss u...
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作者：Bernhardt, Dan; Ghosh, Meenakshi
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Warwick
摘要：We analyze primary and general election campaigning. Positive campaigning builds a candidate's reputation; negative campaigning damages a rival's. Each primary candidate hopes to win the general election; but failing that, he wants his primary rival to win. We establish that general elections always feature more negative campaigning than positive, as long as reputations are easier to tear down than build up. In contrast, if the effects of primary campaigns strongly persist, primary elections a...
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作者：Boonmanunt, Suparee; Kajackaite, Agne; Meier, Stephan
作者单位：Mahidol University; Mahidol University; Columbia University
摘要：Cheating such as corruption and tax evasion is prevalent in the developing world; therefore, many interventions have been undertaken to reduce cheating in developing countries. Although some field evidence shows that poverty is correlated with cheating, the causal effect of poverty on cheating in the field and the effectiveness of interventions for financially constrained people remain an open question. We present results from a lab-in-the-field experiment with low-income rice farmers in Thail...
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作者：Hillas, John; Kvasov, Dmitriy
作者单位：University of Auckland; Waseda University
摘要：The equilibrium concepts that we now think of as various forms of backwards induction, namely, subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), and quasi-perfect equilibrium (van Damme, 1984), while formally well defined in a wider class of games, are explicitly restricted to games with perfect recall. We argue that in games without perfect recall the original definitions are inappropriate. Our reading of the origi...
