Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bilancini, Ennio; Boncinelli, Leonardo; Newton, Jonathan
• 署名单位: IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca; University of Florence; Kyoto University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.004
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 68-80
• 关键词: evolution; stochastic stability; matching; Rawlsian

摘要

This paper considers the marriage problem under dynamic rematching. It is shown that if players who obtain higher payoffs are less likely to experiment with non-best response behavior, then matchings selected in the long run will belong to the set of Rawlsian stable matchings - the set of stable matchings which maximize the payoff of the worst off player. Conversely, alternative behavioral rules will fail to select Rawlsian stable matchings in some environments. This constitutes an evolutionary axiomatization of Rawlsian stable matchings in terms of the behavioral rules that give rise to them. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.