Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kayaba, Yutaka; Matsushima, Hitoshi; Toyama, Tomohisa
• 署名单位: University of Tokyo; International Christian University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.003
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 193-208
• 关键词: Repeated prisoner's dilemma; Imperfect private monitoring; experiments; Generous tit-for-tat; Retaliation intensity

摘要

We experimentally examine repeated prisoner's dilemma with random termination, in which monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of the subjects follows generous tit-for-tat strategies, which are stochastic extensions of tit-for-tat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the generous tit-for-tat equilibrium behavior. Showing inconsistent behavior, subjects with low accuracy do not tend to retaliate more than those with high accuracy. Furthermore, subjects with low accuracy tend to retaliate considerably with lesser strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, while subjects with high accuracy tend to retaliate with more strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, or with strength almost equivalent to it. (C) 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.