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作者：Margaria, Chiara
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：This paper examines the interplay of informational and payoff externalities in a two-player irreversible investment game. Each player learns about the quality of his project by observing a private signal and the action of his opponent. I characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium in a timing game that features a second-mover advantage, allowing for arbitrary correlation in project qualities. Despite private learning, the game reduces to a stochastic war of attrition. In contrast to the case...
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作者：Bonifacio, Agustin G.; Masso, Jordi
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that do main and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Coffman, Lucas; Niehaus, Paul
作者单位：Boston College; University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：While economic theories of persuasion emphasize the role of self-interest, others emphasize other-regard. To study these pathways, we introduce a simple experimental framework where sellers use free-form conversation to convince buyers to raise their valuations for objects. We find sellers more frequently target buyers' self-interest, and changes in selfinterest explain more variation in persuasion overall. Additionally, sellers' gains along one pathway come at a considerable cost along the ot...
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作者：Arigapudi, Srinivas
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We consider a model of stochastic evolution under the probit choice rule. In the small noise double limit, where first the noise level in agents' decisions is taken to zero, and then the population size to infinity, escape from and transitions between equilibria can be described in terms of solutions to continuous optimal control problems. We use results from optimal control theory to solve the exit cost problem. This is used to determine the most likely exit paths from the initial basin of at...
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作者：Arnold, Michael; Zhang, Lan
作者单位：University of Delaware; Beijing Normal University; Beijing Normal University Zhuhai
摘要：We characterize equilibria of a market in which firms with asymmetric loyal customer bases can pay a fixed cost to advertise prices through an information clearinghouse to compete for shoppers. We find that the magnitude of the advertising cost and differences in the sizes of the firms' loyal market shares are critical in determining which firms compete for shoppers in equilibrium. If the advertising cost is sufficiently low, then only the two firms with the smallest loyal market shares advert...
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作者：Bykhovskaya, Anna
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：The paper investigates conditions which guarantee the existence of a stable outcome in a school matching in the presence of peer effects. We consider an economy where students are characterized by their type and schools are characterized by their quality and capacity. We divide students and schools into groups, so that going to a school outside of one's group is associated with additional costs or prohibited. A student receives utility from a school per se and from one's classmates. We find th...
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作者：Kakhbod, Ali; Song, Fei
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper studies how information design, via public disclosure of past trade details, affects price discovery in a dynamic market. We model that an informed forward-looking buyer sequentially trades with a series of uninformed sellers (hedgers) with heterogenous hedging motives. We discover that sellers' price discovery over the underlying hidden fundamentals is crucially affected by what they can observe about past trade details. Specifically, (i) the availability of past trade details, par...
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作者：Friedman, Evan
摘要：We endogenize the precision parameter lambda of logit quantal response equilibrium (LQRE). In the first stage of an endogenous quantal response equilibrium (EQRE), each player chooses her precision optimally subject to costs, taking as given other players' (secondstage) behavior. In the second stage, the distribution of players' actions is a heterogenous LQRE given the profile of first-stage precision choices. EQRE satisfies a modified version of the regularity axioms, nests LQRE as a limiting...
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作者：Levy, Yehuda John; Veiga, Andre
作者单位：University of Glasgow; Imperial College London
摘要：Frictionless consumer choices and price competition are often associated with competitive markets and vanishing equilibrium profits. We discuss vanishing profits in competitive screening markets like insurance. We assume symmetric firms which exhibit constant returns to scale. Consumer heterogeneity creates the possibility of adverse selection. Firms can offer multiple contracts in equilibrium and (importantly) in any deviation. Nash equilibrium profits vanish if each consumer has a unique opt...
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作者：Sperisen, Benjamin; Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：Amazon.com; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We model stable, non-assortative labor-market matchings. We endogenize how transferable utility is: a matched firm and worker play an infinite-horizon game with one-sided moral hazard. Becker's (1973) result that complementarity yields positively assortative matching fails, because increasing match quality harms dynamic incentives: a firm cannot credibly threaten to fire a worker who is productive even with low effort. Thus, firms may prefer lower-type workers who will exert more effort. We of...
