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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Bonanno, Giacomo; van der Hoek, Wiebe
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of California System; University of California Davis; University of Liverpool
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作者：Cho, Wonki Jo; Ju, Biung-Ghi
作者单位：Korea University; Seoul National University (SNU); Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：Consider social decision rules identifying two or more groups by aggregating individual opinions on who belong to which group. We search for rules respecting cross-group independence in the aggregation process. This independence axiom or its variants, together with other implicit constraints in the two models by Miller (2008) and Cho and Ju (2017), characterize a restricted family of rules; the only democratic rule in this family is the liberal rule. Our new framework provides a unified perspe...
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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Minardi, Stefania; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University; Yale University
摘要：We present and axiomatize a model combining and generalizing theory-based and analogy-based reasoning in decision under uncertainty. An agent has beliefs over a set of theories describing the data generating process, given by decision weights. She also puts weight on similarity to past cases. When a case is added to her memory and a new problem is encountered, two types of learning take place. First, the decision weight assigned to each theory is multiplied by its conditional probability. Seco...
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作者：Hagiwara, Makoto
作者单位：University of Osaka; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：We identify an error in Theorem 1 of Miyagawa (2002), and then we construct two game forms to achieve his objective. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bernheim, B. Douglas; Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
摘要：We present a theory that rationalizes voters' preferences for decisive leaders. Greater decisiveness entails an inclination to reach decisions more quickly conditional on fixed information. Although speed can be good or bad, agency problems between voters and politicians create preferences among voters for leaders who perceive high costs of delay and have little uncertainty about how to weigh different aspects of the decision problem, and hence who make decisions more rapidly than typical vote...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Smorodinsky, Rann
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：Consider a setting where many individuals forecast the (unknown) state of nature based on signals they receive independently. We refer to the joint distribution over the states and signals as an information structure. An information structure is deemed identifiable if the distribution of forecasts is sufficient to determine the state of nature, even without knowing the underlying information structure. We characterize the set of identifiable information structures and propose a scheme that uni...
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作者：Shneyerov, Artyom; Wong, Adam C. L.
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; Concordia University - Canada; Lingnan University
摘要：We introduce aggregate uncertainty into a Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985)-type dynamic matching and bilateral bargaining model. The market can be either in a high state, where there are more buyers than sellers, or in a low state, where there are more sellers than buyers. Traders do not know the state. They randomly meet each other and bargain by making take-it-or-leave-it offers. The only information transmitted in a meeting is the time a trader spent on the market. There are two kinds of sear...
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作者：Tajika, Tomoya
摘要：Dynamic public good contribution games in the literature allow players to contribute in multiple periods. These games typically have inefficient and, sometimes, (approximately) efficient subgame perfect equilibria. Inefficiency can take the form of either delayed provision or nonprovision of the public good. In contrast, this paper studies a game that differs primarily in that each player can contribute only once. Each player thus chooses the period at which they contribute, and the size of th...
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作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Sharma, Tridib; Vadovic, Radovan
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Carleton University
摘要：Studies of strategic sophistication in experimental normal form games commonly assume that subjects' beliefs are consistent with independent choice. This paper examines whether beliefs are consistent with correlated choice. Players play a sequence of 2 x 2 normal form games with distinct opponents and no feedback. Another set of players, called predictors, report a likelihood ranking over possible outcomes. A substantial proportion of the reported rankings are consistent with the predictors be...
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作者：Gatti, Nicola; Gilli, Mario; Marchesi, Alberto
作者单位：Polytechnic University of Milan; University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：We provide a characterization of quasi perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-perfect equilibrium can be obtained as limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibria of a certain class of perturbed games in sequence form, and any limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibria of these perturbed games is a quasi-perfect equilibrium. We prove that, in games with three or more players, we need trembles defined as rational functions of the perturbation magnitude epsilon, whereas, i...
