Non-equilibrium play in centipede games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garcia-Pola, Bernardo; Iriberri, Nagore; Kovarik, Jaromir
• 署名单位: University of Basque Country; Basque Foundation for Science; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.007
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 391-433
• 关键词: Centipede games; bounded rationality; Common knowledge of rationality; Quantal response equilibrium; Level-k model; experiments; mixture-of-types models

摘要

Centipede games represent a classic example of a strategic situation, where the equilibrium prediction is at odds with human behavior. This study is explicitly designed to discriminate among the proposed explanations for initial responses in centipede games. Using many different centipede games, our approach determines endogenously whether one or more explanations are empirically relevant. We find that non-equilibrium behavior is too heterogeneous to be explained by a single model. However, most non-equilibrium choices can be fully explained by level-k thinking and quantal response equilibrium but each model for different subjects. Preference-based models play a negligible role in explaining nonequilibrium play. Crown Copyright (C) 2020 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.