-
作者：Ciccarone, Giuseppe; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni; Papa, Stefano
作者单位：Sapienza University Rome; Universita della Campania Vanvitelli
摘要：We aim to empirically investigate the rationale of in-group-favoritism. As potential explanations, we concentrate on intrinsic preferences for own-group members and motivations related to individuals caring about the beliefs of others (founded on guilt aversion). We also consider their intersection. Our evidence shows that in-group-favoritism cannot be accounted for by changes in expectations. This suggests that preferences per se are the most powerful explanation of social identity. (c) 2020 ...
-
作者：Feldman, Michal; Fu, Hu; Gravin, Nick; Lucier, Brendan
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Microsoft
摘要：A simultaneous item auction is a simple procedure for allocating multiple indivisible goods to a set of bidders. In a simultaneous auction, every bidder submits bids on all items simultaneously. The allocation and prices are then resolved for each item separately, based solely on the bids submitted on that item. Such procedures are similar to auctions used in practice (e.g. eBay) but are not incentive compatible. We study the efficiency of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) outcomes of simultaneo...
-
作者：Catonini, Emiliano; De Vito, Nicodemo
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：We provide epistemic foundations for permissibility (Brandenburger, 1992), a strategic-form solution concept for finite games which coincides with the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure, i.e., the elimination of all weakly dominated strategies, followed by the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We show that permissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of cautious rationality and common weak belief of cautious rationality in the canonical, universal type structure for lex...
-
作者：Leung, Benson Tsz Kin
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper studies the information processing behavior of a decision maker (DM) who can only process a subset of all information he receives: before taking an action, the DM receives sequentially a number of signals and decides whether to process or ignore each of them as it is received. The model generates an information processing behavior consistent with that documented in the psychological literature: first, the DM chooses to process signals that are strong; second, his processing strategy...
-
作者：Sun, Ching-jen
作者单位：Deakin University
摘要：We study the structure of Nash equilibria in generic n x n games. A game is said to have a sandwich structure in Nash equilibria if there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium inside every collection of pure strategy Nash equilibria. A sufficient condition, which solely relies on the ordinal information of the game, is given for a generic n x n game to have a sandwich structure in Nash equilibria. We provide a lower bound on the number of Nash equilibria and determine the stability of each equi...
-
作者：Hillas, John; Samet, Dov
作者单位：University of Auckland; Tel Aviv University
摘要：There are four types of dominance depending on whether domination is strict or weak and whether the dominating strategy is pure or mixed. Letting d vary over these four types of dominance, we say that a player is d-dominance rational when she does not play a strategy that is d-dominated relative to what she knows. For weak dominance by a mixed strategy, Stalnaker (1994) introduced a process of iterative maximal elimination of certain profiles that we call here flaws. We define here, analogousl...
-
作者：Solan, Eilon; Solan, Omri N.; Solan, Ron
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study the implementation of a jointly controlled lottery when the coins that are used by the players are exogenously given. We apply this result to show that every quitting game in which at least two players have at least two continue actions has an undiscounted epsilon-equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Rainer, Catherine; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Universite de Bretagne Occidentale
摘要：We study the optimal use of information in Markov games with incomplete information on one side and two states. We provide a finite-stage algorithm for calculating the limit value as the gap between stages goes to 0, and an optimal strategy for the informed player in the limiting game in continuous time. This limiting strategy induces an c-optimal strategy for the informed player, provided the gap between stages is small. Our results demonstrate when the informed player should use her informat...
-
作者：Vasquez, Jorge; Weretka, Marek
作者单位：Smith College; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：In this paper, we examine strategic settings in which players have interdependent preferences. Players' utility functions depend not only on the strategy profile being played, but also on the realized utilities of other players. Thus, players' realized utilities are interdependent, capturing the psychological phenomena of affective empathy and emotional contagion. We offer a solution concept for these empathetic games and show that the set of equilibria is non-empty and, generically, finite. M...
-
作者：Alston, Max
作者单位：Australian National University; Reserve Bank of Australia
摘要：This article extends the model of matching with incomplete information presented by Liu et al. (2014) by imposing exogenous restrictions on the beliefs of firms. The main result is that generically, there is always some game that contradicts the imposition of exogenous beliefs. This result complements Liu et al. (2014) by showing that their focus on stability for all reasonable beliefs is appropriate. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
