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作者：Michaeli, Moti
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：The tendency of people to divide into groups and to show in-group bias - preferential treatment for insiders - is widely observed. This paper shows that it arises naturally when people incur a moral cost when defecting against cooperators, provided that this cost is concave in the number of such defections. If some people are asocial, i.e. insusceptible to the moral cost, then, under incomplete information, free-riding and cooperation can coexist within groups. Costly signaling of sociality en...
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作者：Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Mu'alem, Ahuva
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We study implementability and revenue equivalence for selling mechanisms in a model where a seller has multiple items to allocate, and a buyer has private valuations and private budgets. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for selling mechanisms to be incentive compatible and ex-post budget feasible for the buyer and derive the revenue equivalence principle in the presence of private budgets. Our conditions are based on a novel network approach that exploits the difference between u...
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作者：Mackenzie, Andrew
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We consider probabilistic versions of obviously strategy-proof implementation (Li, 2017) for stochastic rules, and provide an algorithm involving several ideas from the literature (Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2018; Pycia and Troyan, 2016; Bade and Gonczarowski, 2017) that converts any such implementation into a randomized round table implementation, where the administrator randomly selects a game form in which agents take turns making public announcements about their private information (Theorem...
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作者：Li, Chen; Turmunkh, Uyanga; Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; IESEG School of Management
摘要：This paper examines the difference between strategic ambiguity as in game theory and ambiguity arising in individual decisions. We identify a new, non-strategic component underlying all strategic ambiguities, called social ambiguity. We recommend controlling for it to better identify strategic causes. Thus, we shed new light on Bohnet and Zeckhauser's betrayal aversion in the trust game. We first show theoretically that, contrary to preceding claims in the literature, ambiguity attitudes can p...
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作者：Song, Yangbo; Zhang, Jiahua
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; South China University of Technology
摘要：We study observational learning among agents with coordination motives. On a discrete time line, communities of agents receive private information about an uncertain state, observe some predecessors' actions, and then take their own action. An agent's payoff is both state-dependent and increasing in the number of her peers taking the same action as hers. We find that connectivity between observations is the key determinant of the equilibrium pattern of information aggregation. When observation...
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作者：Noussair, Charles N.; Seres, Gyula
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Arizona; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：This paper examines the effect of collusion on allocative efficiency in a second-price sealed-bid auction, in which bidders' valuations have both private and common value components. We present a theoretical model which shows that explicit collusion improves average efficiency. Furthermore, a reduction in common value signal variance increases the efficiency of allocations when a cartel is present. We test for the presence of these patterns in a laboratory experiment. Subjects can choose wheth...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; He, Kevin
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); California Institute of Technology; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period. Inexperienced agents are uncertain about the prevailing distribution of opponents' play, but believe that opponents never choose conditionally dominated strategies. Agents engage in active learning and update beliefs based on personal observations. Payoff information...
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作者：Norman, Thomas W. L.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：The Hahn problem is that, even if a monetary equilibrium with valued fiat money exists in general equilibrium, a nonmonetary equilibrium with a zero price on money generally also exists; why should we expect the former over the latter? Here, I consider the preferences that will survive repeated trading in an exchange economy where agents compete in biological fitness. With unobservable preferences and positive assortativity in matching, evolutionarily stable preferences implement the competiti...
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作者：Atakan, Alp; Kockesen, Levent; Kubilay, Elif
作者单位：Koc University; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Essex
摘要：We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a Markovian property and show that if the potential conflict of interest is large, then the stakes increase over time, i.e., starting small is the unique equilibrium arrangement. In each period, the receiver play...
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作者：Liu, Peng
作者单位：East China Normal University
摘要：We present a possibility result on the existence of a random assignment rule satisfying sd-strategy-proofness, sd-efficiency, and equal treatment of equals. In particular, we introduce a class of preference domains: sequentially dichotomous domains. On any such domain, the probabilistic serial rule (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)) is sd-strategy-proof. Moreover, any sequentially dichotomous domain is maximal for this rule to be sd-strategy-proof. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
