-
作者：Malmendier, Ulrike; Szeidl, Adam
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Central European University
摘要：We show that common market settings tend to amplify rather than reduce the effect of behavioral biases on prices and other market outcomes. We study two common market mechanisms, auctions and fixed-price markets, and establish three results. First, agents with upward-biased valuations have an amplified effect on market outcomes because markets over-select them relative to their population share. Intuitively, markets fish for fools. Second, auctions are often more efficient at fishing than fixe...
-
作者：Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard C.
作者单位：Xi'an Jiaotong University; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (i.e., about the quality of a product) to a receiver. Sequential equilibrium and iterated admissibility predict unraveling of information. Iterated admissibility also provides predictions for every finite level of reasoning about rationality. We observe behavior consistent with relatively high levels of reasoning. Iterated admissibility implies that the leve...
-
作者：Au, Pak Hung; Kawai, Keiichi
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Talamas, Eduard; Vohra, Rakesh
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Risk compensation can undermine the ability of partially effective vaccines to curb epidemics: Vaccinated agents may optimally choose to engage in more risky interactions and, as a result, may increase everyone's infection probability. We show that-in contrast to the prediction of standard models-things can be worse than that: Free and perfectly safe but only partially effective vaccines can reduce everyone's welfare, and hence fail to satisfy-in a strong sense-the fundamental principle of fir...
-
作者：Fiedler, Susann; Hillenbrand, Adrian
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：Framing influences choice. However, little is known about the underlying mechanisms behind framing effects. We study gain-loss framing in binary modified dictator games. Subjects choose the selfish option more often in the loss frame compared to the gain frame. Recording visual fixations with eye-tracking, we find that dictators focus more on their own outcomes when facing losses. This suggests that losses to the own outcome are weighted more than losses to another player. (C) 2020 Elsevier In...
-
作者：Herbold, Daniel; Schumacher, Heiner
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; KU Leuven
摘要：This paper studies how workers' on-the-job search influences optimal incentives in organizations. We analyze a principal-agent model in which the agent multitasks between working for the principal and searching for other job opportunities. The agent partly uses on-the-job search to improve his bargaining position within the relationship. We show that the optimal contract may feature both excessive performance bonuses as well as efficiency wages. Both measures reduce the agent's search incentiv...
-
作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Corrao, Roberto; Sanna, Federico
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider multi-stage games with incomplete information, and we analyze strategic reasoning by means of epistemic events within a total state space made of all the profiles of behaviors (paths of play) and possibly incoherent infinite hierarchies of conditional beliefs. Thus, we do not rely on types structures, or similar epistemic models. Subjective rationality is defined by the conjunction of coherence of belief hierarchies, rational planning, and consistency between plan and on-path behav...
-
作者：Guarino, Pierfrancesco
作者单位：University of Klagenfurt
摘要：We introduce a novel framework to describe dynamic interactive reasoning in presence of unawareness. We extend the notion of conditional probability systems for this setting and we perform the construction of the corresponding canonical hierarchical structure, that is, the structure that contains all coherent infinite hierarchies of beliefs in presence of unawareness and conditioning events, which is an extension of the one constructed in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999a). Relying on the exis...
-
作者：He, Simin; Wu, Jiabin
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Oregon
摘要：This study experimentally examines the role of a compromise option in a repeated battleof-the-sexes game. In a random matching environment, we find that compromise serves as an effective focal point and facilitates coordination, but fails to improve efficiency. However, in a fixed-partnership environment, compromise deters subjects from learning to play alternation, which is a more efficient, but arguably more complex strategy. As a result, compromise hurts efficiency by allowing subjects to c...
-
作者：Abraham, Ittai; Athey, Susan; Babaioff, Moshe; Grubb, Michael D.
作者单位：VMware, Inc.; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
摘要：We study how ex ante information asymmetries affect revenue in common-value second price auctions, motivated by online advertising auctions where cookies inform individual advertisers about advertising opportunities. We distinguish information structures in which cookies identify lemons (low-value impressions) from those in which cookies identify peaches (high-value impressions). As this setting features multiple Nash equilibria, we introduce a new refinement, tremble robust equilibrium (TRE) ...
