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作者：Aziz, Haris; Lee, Barton E.
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Oxford
摘要：A well-known axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC). We characterize committees satisfying PSC as the range of outcomes obtained by the class of Minimal Demand rules, which generalizes an approach pioneered by eminent philosopher Sir Michael Dummett. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Tajika, Tomoya
摘要：We study a common-value voting model, in which private signal is typically informative but may be unreliable. Reliability determines the precision and the meaning of voters' private signals. These private signals are negatively correlated between different reliabilities. Each voter also receives noisy signals about reliability itself. When the population is sufficiently large, a bad equilibrium exists, in which all voters ignore reliability signals. It is thus possible that, at equilibrium, th...
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作者：Georgiadis, George; Kim, Youngsoo; Kwon, H. Dharma
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well-known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show that if the players' payoffs whilst in war vary stochastically and their exit payoffs are heterogeneous, then the game admits Markov Perfect equilibria in pure strategies only. This is true irrespective of the degree of randomness and heterogeneity, thus highl...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Takahashi, Satoru; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; University of Tokyo; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：Following Fudenberg et al. (1988) and Dekel and Fudenberg (1990), we say that a refinement of (interim correlated) rationalizability is robust if it is prescribed by a solution correspondence that is upper hemicontinuous with respect to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We characterize robust refinements of rationalizability subject to arbitrary common knowledge restrictions on payoffs. We demonstrate how the characterization pins down a novel family of robust refinements of rationalizabi...
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作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Dobzinski, Shahar; Oren, Sigal
摘要：We study combinatorial auctions with bidders that exhibit an endowment effect. In most of the previous work on cognitive biases in algorithmic game theory the focus was on analyzing the implications and mitigating their negative consequences. In contrast, in this paper we show how in some cases cognitive biases can be harnessed to obtain better outcomes. Specifically, we study Walrasian equilibria in combinatorial markets. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria exist only in limited settin...
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作者：Kim, Kyungmin; Koh, Youngwoo
作者单位：Emory University; Korea University
摘要：We consider independent private value auctions in which prior to bidding, each bidder engages in fully flexible information acquisition, choosing not only how much information but also what information to acquire about his value. Focusing on a tractable environment with binary underlying values and posterior-separable information costs, we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and investigate the effects of information costs on auction outcomes. We also analyze how the reserve price in...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：The Chairman Paradox (Farquharson, 1969) is a classical observation in voting games showing that a Chairman endowed with tie-breaking power might end up with her worst outcome. The analysis posits three players whose preferences build a Condorcet cycle and invokes Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies (IEWDS) to select a unique equilibrium. However, IEWDS is a controversial procedure which exhibits well-known weaknesses. This work relies on non-controversial equilibrium refinemen...
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作者：Prato, Carlo; Wolton, Stephane
作者单位：Columbia University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：The Condorcet Jury Theorem and subsequent literature establish the feasibility of information aggregation in a common-value environment with exogenous policy options: a large electorate of imperfectly informed voters almost always selects the correct policy option. Rather than directly voting for policies, citizens in modern representative democracies elect candidates who make strategic policy commitments. We show that intermediation by candidates sometimes improves policy choices and sometime...
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作者：Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel
作者单位：Queensland University of Technology (QUT); University of Innsbruck; University of Queensland
摘要：In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition formation stage. This creates the possibility for some players to ask for a renegotiation of the initial split. We predict that, in such situations, a player can suffer from being too strong. Our experimen...
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作者：Afacan, Mustafa Oguz; Evdokimov, Piotr; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Turhan, Bertan
作者单位：Sabanci University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of Lausanne; Iowa State University
摘要：When applying to schools, students often submit applications to distinct school systems that operate independently, which leads to waste and distortions of stability due to miscoordination. To alleviate this issue, Manjunath and Turhan (2016) introduce the Iterative Deferred Acceptance mechanism (IDA). We design an experiment to compare the performance of this mechanism under parallel markets (DecDA2) to the classic Deferred Acceptance mechanism with both divided (DecDA) and unified markets (D...
