Voting on tricky questions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tajika, Tomoya
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.008
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 380-389
• 关键词: Information aggregation; INEFFICIENCY; Precision uncertainty; strategic voting

摘要

We study a common-value voting model, in which private signal is typically informative but may be unreliable. Reliability determines the precision and the meaning of voters' private signals. These private signals are negatively correlated between different reliabilities. Each voter also receives noisy signals about reliability itself. When the population is sufficiently large, a bad equilibrium exists, in which all voters ignore reliability signals. It is thus possible that, at equilibrium, the majority rule makes an incorrect decision with a probability close to one. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.