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作者：Domenech, Gerard; Nunez, Marina
作者单位：University of Barcelona
摘要：In the multiple-partners job market, introduced in (Sotomayor, 1992), each firm can hire several workers and each worker can be hired by several firms, up to a given quota. We show that, in contrast to what happens in the simple assignment game, in this extension, the firms-optimal stable rules are neither valuation monotonic nor pairwise monotonic. However, we show that the firms-optimal stable rules satisfy a weaker property, what we call firm-covariance, and that this property characterizes...
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作者：Fischbacher, Urs; Hausfeld, Jan; Renerte, Baiba
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam; University of Bern; University of Zurich
摘要：People often have to judge the social motives of others, for example, to distinguish truly prosocial people from those merely trying to appear prosocial. Gaze can reveal the motives underlying social decisions, as decision-makers dedicate more attention to motive-relevant information. We extend the use of eye-tracking and apply it as a communication device by providing (real-time) eye-tracking information of one participant to another. We find that untrained observers can judge the prosocialit...
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作者：Guarino, Pierfrancesco; Ziegler, Gabriel
作者单位：University of Udine; University of Edinburgh; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We study players interacting under the veil of ignorance, who have-coarse-beliefs represented as subsets of opponents' actions. We analyze when these players follow max min or max max decision criteria, which we identify with pessimistic or optimistic attitudes, respectively. Explicitly formalizing these attitudes and how players reason interactively under ignorance, we characterize the behavioral implications related to common belief in these events: while optimism is related to Point Rationa...
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作者：Fallucchi, Francesco; Luccasen, R. Andrew, III; Turocy, Theodore L.
作者单位：University of Bergamo; University of East Anglia
摘要：We extend the study of behavioural types in voluntary contribution games, adapting the elicitation method of Fischbacher et al. (2001) to a broader range of economic and strategic incentives. Our results in the standard VCM game align with previous findings in many respects; in particular, we identify one-quarter of participants as a distinctive group of strong conditional cooperators. We provide an explanation for the behaviour of this group by tracking their contribution strategies as the fi...
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作者：Bastani, Spencer; Giebe, Thomas; Guertler, Oliver
作者单位：Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Linnaeus University; University of Cologne
摘要：We show how symmetric equilibria emerge in general two-player contests in which skill and effort are combined to produce output according to a general production technology and players have skills drawn from different distributions. The model includes the Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981) models as special cases. Our paper provides intuition regarding how the contest components interact to determine the incentive to exert effort and sheds new light on classic comparative statics resul...
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作者：Bahel, Eric; Ball, Sheryl; Sarangi, Sudipta
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We consider a Prisoner's Dilemma model with a pre-play communication stage. Players get a disutility from deceiving others after sending a message of conditional cooperation. Each player's realized lying aversion cost is private information. We prove existence and characterize the (unique) symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium that maximizes cooperation. In this distinguished equilibrium, the frequency of cooperation decreases as material gains from lying (or losses from being deceived) incre...
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作者：Heymann, Benjamin; De Lara, Michel; Chancelier, Jean -Philippe
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：We propose an alternative to the tree representation of extensive form games. Games in product form represent information with sigma-fields over a product set, and do not require an explicit description of the play temporal ordering, as opposed to extensive form games on trees. This representation encompasses games with continuum of actions and imperfect information. We adapt and prove Kuhn's theorem - regarding equivalence between mixed and behavioral strategies under perfect recall - for gam...
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作者：Pahlke, Marieke
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper explores multi-stage incomplete information games with common ambiguous information about states or types and ambiguity averse players. We characterize a belief formation process that allows players to take their knowledge about the structure of the game into account. This process leads to subjective rectangular ex-ante belief sets for all players. We show that given these sets of beliefs, players behave dynamically consistent. Therefore, using our belief formation process, we can e...
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作者：Berden, Caroline; Peters, Hans; Robles, Laura; Vermeulen, Dries
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We consider a model where the same group of players is involved in more than one cooperative (transferable utility) game. A rule determines the payoffs per game, and for each player a utility function evaluates the resulting vector of payoffs. We assume that each player, independently, can make transfers of worth between different games, thereby affecting its payoff vector and, thus, utility. Two transfer systems are considered, resulting in two distinct noncooperative games, and the focus of ...
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作者：Friedman, Daniel; Habib, Sameh; James, Duncan; Williams, Brett
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; Fordham University
摘要：We explore risk preference elicitation when subjects choose directly from an exogenously specified set of lotteries. Our choice tasks differ incrementally, e.g., from choosing between two lotteries to selecting a portfolio from a continuous set of bundled Arrow securities, and from text to spatial presentation. Each subject completes multiple instances of five different tasks, and responses for each task are summarized in parametric (CRRA) and non-parametric (normalized risk premium) measures ...
