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作者：Can, Burak; Hougaard, Jens Leth; Pourpouneh, Mohsen
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Copenhagen; University of Oxford
摘要：This paper proposes a conceptual framework for the analysis of reward sharing schemes in mining pools, such as those associated with Bitcoin. The framework is centered around the reported shares in a pool instead of agents and introduces two new fairness criteria: absolute and relative redistribution. These criteria impose that the addition of a share to a round affects all previous shares of the round in the same way, either in absolute amount or in relative ratio. We characterize two large c...
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作者：Ramezanian, Rasoul; Feizi, Mehdi
作者单位：Ferdowsi University Mashhad; Ferdowsi University Mashhad
摘要：A random assignment is robust ex-post Pareto efficient whenever for any of its lottery decomposition, each deterministic assignment in its support is Pareto efficient. We show that ordinal efficiency implies robust ex-post Pareto efficiency while the reverse does not hold. We know that strategy-proof and ordinal efficient mechanisms satisfy neither equal treatment of equals nor equal division lower bound. We prove that it is not possible to avoid these two impossibilities by weakening ordinal ...
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作者：Kyropoulou, Maria; Ortega, Josue; Segal-Halevi, Erel
作者单位：University of Essex; Queens University Belfast; Ariel University
摘要：Using two lab experiments, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. Although the observed subjects' strategic behavior eliminates the fairness guarantees of envy-free procedures, we nonetheless find evidence that suggests that envy-free procedures are fairer than their proportional counterparts. Our results support the practical use of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway procedure, and more ...
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作者：Silva, Francisco
作者单位：Deakin University
摘要：Experts who rely heavily on their network of clients to provide good advice tend to suggest instead that their expertise is due to their technical knowledge. I show how doubt over the experts' source of expertise might not only help these experts but also their clients. Furthermore, I show how it is possible for them to sustain such doubt indefinitely even when their clients have rational expectations.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hillas, John; Samet, Dov
作者单位：University of Auckland; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study new non-Bayesian solutions of games in strategic form, based on four notions of dominance: weak or strict domination by either a pure or a mixed strategy. For each of these types of dominance, d, we define a family of sets of strategy profiles, called d correlated equilibria. We study the structure and properties of these families. A player is d dominance rational when she does not play a strategy that is d-dominated relative to what she knows about the play of the other players. A se...
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作者：Chiba, Saori; Hori, Kazumi
作者单位：Kyoto Sangyo University; Ritsumeikan University
摘要：We investigate a cheap talk model in which a decision maker and an expert are both privately informed. Both players observe independent signals that jointly determine ideal actions for the players, and the decision maker can send a cheap talk message to the expert, which is followed by the cheap talk of the expert and then the action of the decision maker. In equilibrium, the strategy of the decision maker is not monotonic, and the revelation of the decision maker concerning her information do...
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作者：Schnedler, Wendelin
作者单位：University of Paderborn
摘要：Psychologists claim that being treated kindly puts individuals in a positive emotional state: they then treat an unrelated third party more kindly. Numerous experiments document that subjects indeed 'pay forward' specific behavior. For example, they are less generous after having experienced stinginess. This, however, is not necessarily driven by emotions. Subjects may also imitate what they regard as socially adequate behavior. Here, I present an experiment in which imitation is not possible ...
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作者：Ding, Sihua
作者单位：Nankai University
摘要：Studies on network formation employ rather different assumptions on link formation and make different predictions. We propose a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) link formation specification that generalizes commonly used link formation assumptions and parametrizes a factor that could affect network formation, namely, link investment substitutability (LIS). We apply this approach to the model by Galeotti and Goyal (2010) that studies public good provision on an endogenously formed netw...
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作者：Kirkegaard, Rene
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：In the standard independent private values model, the second-price auction (SPA) is generally taken to be more efficient than the first-price auction (FPA) when bidders are asymmetric. However, this conclusion assumes that reserve prices are identical across auctions. This paper endogenizes the reserve price and shows that it may be lower in the FPA. Hence, gains from trade are realized more often in the FPA. This effect may make the FPA more efficient than the SPA. Indeed, the FPA may Pareto ...
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作者：Currarini, S.; Marchiori, C.
作者单位：University of Leicester; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; University of Brescia
摘要：Issue linkage is often advocated as a powerful mechanism to encourage cooperation on issues where free-riding incentives are significant. The basic idea is to link cooperation on such issues with cooperation on issues that provide (partially) excludable benefits and are therefore less susceptible to free-riding. In this paper, we take a coalition formation approach and study the effects of issue linkage on overall cooperation levels and welfare. We show that, when the linked issues are indepen...
