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作者：Tobias, Aron
作者单位：Syracuse University
摘要：A generalized game is a strategic situation in which agents' behavior restricts their opponents' available action choices, giving rise to interdependencies in terms of what strategy profiles remain mutually feasible. This paper proposes a novel example of a simple jointly convex generalized game in which the well-known convexity, compactness, continuity, and concavity assumptions are satisfied, but no Nash equilibrium exists. The essence of this contribution lies in answering a question left o...
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作者：Rodivilov, Alexander
作者单位：Stevens Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper examines the benefit of monitoring an agent who works on an innovative project of uncertain quality. The agent is asked to experiment to uncover the quality of the project. The agent has the ability to manipulate the principal's beliefs about the project quality because the effort of the agent may not be observable (moral hazard), and success may not be publicly observed (hidden information). The optimal timing of monitoring trades off the benefit of alleviating the moral hazard pro...
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作者：Awaya, Yu; Do, Jihwan
作者单位：University of Rochester; Wuhan University
摘要：We study a moral hazard problem for a firm with multiple workers where the firm cannot discriminate among workers' wages-equal-pay constraint - and evaluate workers' performances only through peers-subjective peer evaluation. More precisely, each worker privately chooses an effort level, which generates private signals received by his peers. The firm solicits peer evaluations, which are not verifiable. The wage must be equal across workers ex post. We show that the firm can still provide incen...
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作者：Cao, Yiyin; Dang, Chuangyin
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Xi'an Jiaotong University
摘要：The linear tracing procedure plays a central role in the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Nevertheless, it fails to always select a perfect equilibrium when there are more than two players. To fill this gap, we develop a variant of the linear tracing procedure by constituting a perturbed game in which each player maximizes her payoff against a linear convex combination between a totally mixed prior belief profile and a given mixed strategy profile of other players. A...
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作者：Bade, Sophie
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Max Planck Society
摘要：Semi-consistent conditional preferences are inconsistent enough for different ambiguity attitudes to manifest themselves in different behavior and consistent enough for information to be generically valuable. To simultaneously achieve these two desiderata I assume exactly one type of dynamic inconsistency: agents do not update their preferences upon learning independent randomization outcomes. (c) 2022 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Jindapon, Paan; Sujarittanonta, Pacharasut; Viriyavipart, Ajalavat
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; Chulalongkorn University; American University of Sharjah
摘要：We introduce a game in which each player can allocate her endowment in a prize-linked savings (PLS) account, which awards a fixed prize only to a randomly chosen winner. Like Tullock's contest, the probability for each player of winning the prize is the ratio of her PLS deposit to the total deposits made by all participating players. We derive a unique equilibrium and further examine the effects of introducing PLS as an alternative savings option to standard savings (SS), which yields a fixed ...
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作者：Aziz, Haris; Brandl, Florian
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：We consider probabilistic allocation of objects under ordinal preferences and constraints on allocations. We devise an allocation mechanism, called the vigilant eating rule (VER), that applies to nearly arbitrary constraints. It is constrained ordinally efficient, can be computed efficiently for a large class of constraints, and treats agents equally if they have the same preferences and are subject to the same constraints. When the set of feasible allocations is convex, it is characterized by...
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作者：Daskalakis, Constantinos; Syrgkanis, Vasilis
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Microsoft
摘要：A large line of recent work studies the welfare guarantees of simple and prevalent combinatorial auction formats, such as selling m items via simultaneous second price auctions (SiSPAs). These guarantees hold even when the auctions are repeatedly executed and the players use no-regret learning algorithms. Unfortunately, off-the-shelf no-regret algorithms for these auctions are computationally inefficient. We show that this obstacle is insurmountable: there are no polynomial-time no-regret algo...
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作者：Dutting, Paul; Kesselheim, Thomas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bonn
摘要：In a combinatorial auction with item bidding, agents participate in multiple single-item second-price auctions at once. As some items might be substitutes, agents need to strategize in order to maximize their utilities. A number of results indicate that high social welfare can be achieved this way, giving bounds on the welfare at equilibrium. Recently, however, criticism has been raised that equilibria of this game are hard to compute and therefore unlikely to be attained. In this paper, we ta...
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作者：Campos-Mercade, Pol
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Lund University
摘要：Individuals are less likely to make morally desirable decisions when they are in groups. I study when this phenomenon makes groups less likely to produce a morally desirable outcome than one individual alone. I formulate and test a model in which a moral outcome occurs if at least one individual makes a costly decision. Using a lab experiment and data from field experiments on the bystander effect, I show that if most individuals are moral, the moral outcome is more likely to be produced by on...
