Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Prato, Carlo; Wolton, Stephane
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.010
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 86-95
• 关键词: Information aggregation; ELECTIONS; Representative democracy

摘要

The Condorcet Jury Theorem and subsequent literature establish the feasibility of information aggregation in a common-value environment with exogenous policy options: a large electorate of imperfectly informed voters almost always selects the correct policy option. Rather than directly voting for policies, citizens in modern representative democracies elect candidates who make strategic policy commitments. We show that intermediation by candidates sometimes improves policy choices and sometimes impedes information aggregation. Somewhat paradoxically, the possibility of information aggregation by voters encourages strategic conformism by candidates. Correlated information or partisan biases among voters can mitigate the political failure we uncover. We also discuss possible institutional solutions. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.