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作者：Basile, Achille; Rao, Surekha; Rao, K. P. S. Bhaskara
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II; Indiana University System; Indiana University Northwest; Indiana University System; Indiana University Northwest
摘要：Let V be a society whose members express weak preferences about two alternatives. We show simple representation formulae that are valid for all, and only, the elements of various classes of non-manipulable social choice functions on V. We represent the entire class of the non-manipulable social choice functions, and various of its subclasses corresponding to further properties. We focus mainly on anonymity. Efficiency and neutrality up to one voter are also considered. As a consequence of the ...
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作者：Albizuri, M. J.; Goikoetxea, A.
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：In this paper we study probabilistic Owen-Shapley spatial power indices, which are generalizations of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index (1977). We provide an explicit formula for calculating these spatial indices for unanimity games and give an axiomatic characterization of the family of probabilistic Owen-Shapley spatial power indices. We employ an equal power change property, a spatial dummy property, anonymity, a positional invariance property, and a positional continuity property. Some ...
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作者：Ziegler, Gabriel
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：In this note, I explore the implications of informational robustness under the assumption of common belief in rationality. That is, predictions for incomplete-information games which are valid across all possible information structures. First, I address this question from a global perspective and then generalize the analysis to allow for localized informational robustness. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Rosa, Benjamin, V
作者单位：University of Kentucky
摘要：I study the impact of bid credits on simultaneous ascending auctions in a model where bidders potentially have complementary values. Although bid credits can lead to a more equitable distribution of items, I find an additional unintended consequence: bidders without credits are more exposed to winning a less desirable set of items and will drop out of the auction sooner when their competitors have credits. Calibrating the model to data from the Federal Communication Commission's sale of licens...
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作者：Gomes, Armando
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We propose a new solution for coalition bargaining problems among n players that can form coalitions c generating heterogenous coalitional values S-c is an element of R. The players' values v(i) and probability of coalition formation mu(c) are given by: V-i = Sigma(C subset of W) (delta V-i + gamma) I (i is an element of C)mu(C) and Sigma(C subset of W) mu(C) = 1, where coalition c is chosen only if it maximizes the average gain gamma(C) = 1/vertical bar C vertical bar (S-C - delta Sigma(j is ...
