Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Babaioff, Moshe; Dobzinski, Shahar; Oren, Sigal
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.005
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 255-273
• 关键词: Combinatorial auctions; Walrasian equilibrium

摘要

We study combinatorial auctions with bidders that exhibit an endowment effect. In most of the previous work on cognitive biases in algorithmic game theory the focus was on analyzing the implications and mitigating their negative consequences. In contrast, in this paper we show how in some cases cognitive biases can be harnessed to obtain better outcomes. Specifically, we study Walrasian equilibria in combinatorial markets. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria exist only in limited settings, e.g., when all valuations are gross substitutes, but fail to exist in more general settings, e.g., when the valuations are submodular. Our main result shows that when the valuations are submodular, even a mild degree of endowment effect is sufficient to guarantee the existence of Walrasian equilibria.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.