A characterization of proportionally representative committees

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aziz, Haris; Lee, Barton E.
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.006
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 248-255
• 关键词: Committee selection; Multi-winner voting; proportional representation; Single transferable vote

摘要

A well-known axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC). We characterize committees satisfying PSC as the range of outcomes obtained by the class of Minimal Demand rules, which generalizes an approach pioneered by eminent philosopher Sir Michael Dummett. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.