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作者：Lipnowski, Elliot; Mathevet, Laurent; Wei, Dong
作者单位：Columbia University; European University Institute; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some. We study optimal information provision in a tractable model with quadratic payoffs where full disclosure is not optimal. We characterize incentive-compatible information policies, that is, those to which the agent willingly pays full attention. In a leading e...
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作者：Yamaguchi, Yohei
作者单位：Waseda University
摘要：In a political competition, political parties run their campaign communications to attract voters' attention to issues in which the parties have an advantage. Investigating how parties' issue selection strategy affects issue salience is crucial, considering the media outlets' behavior, as most voters receive political communication from parties through media reporting. In this study, I develop an issue selection model that incorporates the profit-maximization behavior of media outlets. First, ...
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Serena, Marco
作者单位：Tulane University; Max Planck Society
摘要：We consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante symmetric players. An effort-maximizing designer commits to a vector of three biases (advantages or disadvantages), one per match. When the designer can choose victory -dependent biases (i.e., biases that depend on the record of matches won by players), the effort-maximizing biases eliminate the momentum effect, leaving players equally likely to win each match and the overall contest. Instead, when the designer can only choose vic...
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作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Gonczarowski, Yannai A.; Nisan, Noam; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Consider a monopolist selling n items to an additive buyer whose item values are drawn from independent distributions F-1, F-2, ..., F-n possibly having unbounded support. Unlike in the single-item case, it is well known that the revenue-optimal selling mechanism (a pricing scheme) may be complex, sometimes requiring a continuum of menu entries. Also known is that simple mechanisms with a bounded number of menu entries can extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. Nonetheless, whethe...
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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
作者单位：University of Southern California; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study from a developmental viewpoint the ability to perform contingent reasoning and the cognitive abilities that facilitate optimal behavior. Individuals from 11 to 17 years old participate in a simplified version of the two-value, deterministic acquire-a company adverse selection game (Charness and Levin, 2009; Martinez-Marquina et al., 2019). We find that even our youngest subjects understand well the basic principles of contingent reasoning (offer the reservation price of one of the se...
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作者：Guha, Brishti; Chowdhury, Prabal Roy
作者单位：Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We examine affirmative action, class-based (CAA), as well as identity-based (IAA), in an economy with income heterogeneity and diverse identity groups. With CAA there exists a unique colour-blind equilibrium where assignment to skilled jobs depends on class, but not on identity. Whereas with IAA, there is a unique equilibrium that exhibits patronisation, i.e. black workers of both income classes face lower standards relative to their white counterparts. Comparing CAA with IAA, poor white worke...
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作者：Boucekkine, Raouf; Fabbri, Giorgio; Federico, Salvatore; Gozzi, Fausto
作者单位：Universite de Rennes; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); INRAE; Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; University of Genoa; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：We characterize the shape of spatial externalities in a continuous time and space differential game with transboundary pollution. We posit a realistic spatiotemporal law of motion for pollution (diffusion and advection), and tackle spatiotemporal non-cooperative (and cooperative) differential games. Precisely, we consider a circle partitioned into several states where a local authority decides autonomously about its investment, production and depollution strategies over time knowing that inves...
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作者：Harless, Patrick; Phan, William
作者单位：University of Arizona; North Carolina State University
摘要：Equity motivates randomization, but often comes at the cost of efficiency. We study the tradeoff within the strategy-proof family of priority rules. Although randomization over all priority orders is incompatible with efficiency, we characterize the maximal subsets of priority for which randomization preserves efficiency: free-agent and adjacent-three families. Introducing equity measures for asymmetric rules, we show that mixtures within these subfamilies admit probabilistic guarantees that p...
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作者：Cho, Wonki Jo
作者单位：Korea University
摘要：We study a model where evaluation consists of multiple components of different nature and (cardinal) performances in all components are aggregated into a summary index between 0 and 1. We propose what we call the normalizer-based aggregation rules and characterize them by individual separability, monotonicity, anonymity, and component independence. Each member in this family is distinguished by three parameters: (i) a profile of weights that determines the relative importance of each component...
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作者：Meng, Dawen; Sun, Lei; Tian, Guoqiang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting & Finance; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Hubei University of Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper studies a mechanism design problem with networked agents and stochastically evolving private information. In contrast to the canonical mechanism design theory focusing only on information asymmetry, we also pay attention to the topology of social network among agents. We find that the standard first-order approach for mechanism design is invalid in dynamic environment. As a remedy, a novel ironing technique is proposed, which produces a perfectly sorting allocation. Based on the opt...
