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作者：Kleinberg, Jon; Kleinberg, Robert; Oren, Sigal
作者单位：Cornell University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We explore the implications of two central human biases studied in behavioral economics, reference points and loss aversion, in optimal stopping problems. In such problems, people evaluate a sequence of options in one pass, either accepting the option and stopping the search or giving up on the option forever. Here we assume that the best option seen so far sets a reference point that shifts as the search progresses, and a biased decision-maker's utility incurs an additional penalty when they ...
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作者：Safi, Shahir
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada
摘要：I consider environments where communication networks are endogenous, but monitoring rules enforce agents to ask consent from others to form new links or break their existing links. A monitoring rule consists of a number x and a collection of groups O such that each agent requires consent from x number of agents in every group she belongs to. First, I show that efficient networks can have at most one component when externalities are positive, whereas they can have multiple components when exter...
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作者：Feri, Francesco; Gantner, Anita; Moffatt, Peter G.; Erharter, Dominik
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Innsbruck; University of East Anglia
摘要：We consider data from an experiment on the minimum-effort game, repeated over many periods. In each play of the game, each player's belief about the minimum-effort of other players in the group is elicited, in addition to the player's chosen effort level. We find that many agents choose effort levels systematically exceeding their beliefs of others' effort levels. We explain this in terms of such subjects taking the role of leader in an attempt to pull the group towards more efficient outcomes...
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作者：Gaechter, Simon; Koelle, Felix; Quercia, Simone
作者单位：University of Nottingham; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Cologne; University of Verona
摘要：We study two generic versions of public goods problems: in Provision problems, the public good does not exist initially and needs to be provided; in Maintenance problems, the public good already exists and needs to be maintained. In four lab and online experiments (n = 2,105), we document a robust asymmetry in preferences and perceptions in two incentive -equivalent versions of these public good problems. We find fewer conditional cooperators and more free riders in Maintenance than Provision,...
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作者：Semirat, Stephan; Forges, Francoise
作者单位：INRAE; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa
摘要：We consider games in which an informed sender first talks at no cost to a receiver; then, the latter proposes a decision and, finally, the sender accepts the proposal or exits . We make the following assumptions: the sender has finitely many types, the receiver's decision is real-valued, utility functions over decisions are concave, single-peaked and single-crossing, exit is damaging to the receiver. In this setup, it may happen that babbling equilibria necessarily involve exit. We nevertheles...
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作者：Gallo, Edoardo; Riyanto, Yohanes E.; Roy, Nilanjan; Teh, Tat-How
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge; Nanyang Technological University; City University of Hong Kong; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：This paper examines experimentally how reputational uncertainty and the rate of change of the social environment determine cooperation. Reputational uncertainty significantly decreases cooperation, while a fast-changing social environment only causes a second order qualitative increase in cooperation. At the individual level, reputational uncertainty induces more leniency and forgiveness in imposing network punishment through the link proposal and removal processes, inhibiting the formation of...
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作者：Konishi, Hideo; Pan, Chen-Yu; Simeonov, Dimitar
作者单位：Boston College; National Chengchi University
摘要：We consider games in which team leaders strategically choose the order of players sent to the battlefield in majoritarian team contests with multiple pairwise battles as in Fu et al. (2015). We consider one-shot order-choice games and battle-by-battle sequential player choice games. We show that as long as the number of players on each team is the same as the number of battles, the equilibrium winning probability of a team and the ex ante expected effort of each player in a multi-battle contes...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of London; University College London
摘要：An estimator is incentive-compatible (for a given prior belief regarding the model's true parameters) if it does not give an agent an incentive to misreport the value of his covariates. Eliaz and Spiegler (2019) studied incentive-compatibility of estimators in a setting with a single binary explanatory variable. We extend this analysis to penalizedregression estimation in a simple multi-variable setting. Our results highlight the incentive problems that are created by the element of variable s...
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作者：Babichenko, Yakov; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Xu, Haifeng; Zabarnyi, Konstantin
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Chicago
摘要：We revisit the celebrated Bayesian persuasion setting and examine how well the Sender can perform when ignorant of the Receiver's utility. Taking an adversarial approach, we measure the signaling scheme performance via (additive) regret over a single persuasion instance. We focus on Receiver with two actions: adoption and rejection, assuming that Sender aims to persuade Receiver to adopt.We show that while Sender's total ignorance of Receiver's utility is extremely harmful to her, assuming tha...
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作者：Lafky, Jonathan; Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：Carleton College; Lehigh University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：The extent of information sharing in strategic communication experiments persistently exceeds what theory predicts. The literature identifies homegrown preferences and heterogeneity in strategic thinking as two major causes of overcommunication. We design an experiment that features team decisions and combines strategic and non-strategic communication to evaluate these competing explanations. We find that (a) the vast majority of strategic truthful behavior in communication of private informat...
