-
作者：Alon, Shiri; Bavly, Gilad; Gayer, Gabrielle
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：We present an axiomatic model of a process wherein likelihoods of eventualities are compared based on data. One eventuality is perceived as more likely than another whenever the data corroborates this conclusion. However, the correct relevance of records to the eventualities under consideration may be impossible to ascertain with any degree of surety due to multiple interpretations of the data, formalized by allowing the evaluator to entertain multiple weighting functions. The evaluator ranks ...
-
作者：Bicchieri, Cristina; Dimant, Eugen; Gaechter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Nottingham; Aarhus University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：We study how compliance with norms of pro-social behavior is influenced by peers' compliance in a dynamic and non-strategic experimental setting. We show that social proximity among peers is a crucial determinant of the effect. Without social proximity, norm compliance erodes swiftly because participants only conform to observed norm violations while ignoring norm compliance. With social proximity, participants conform to both types of observed behaviors, thus halting the erosion of compliance...
-
作者：Babichenko, Yakov; Rubinstein, Aviad
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Stanford University
摘要：For a constant c, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of c-Nash equilibrium in two-player N x N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (c, 0-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1 - 0-fraction of the players are c-best replying. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Lu, Jingfeng; Lu, Yuanzhu; Wang, Zhewei; Zhou, Lixue
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Science & Technology Beijing; Shandong University
摘要：This paper compares two procedures for allocating a sequence of fixed prizes in multistage nested Tullock contests. In a winner-leave (loser-leave) procedure, in each stage, the prizes of the stage are allocated to winners (losers) according to their ranks, and prizes in early stages are higher (lower) than those in later stages. Players who obtain prizes leave the contest and the others proceed to the next stage of competition. For both procedures, it is effort-maximizing to allocate one priz...
-
作者：Barbera, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Universitat de Girona
摘要：We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of pri...
-
作者：Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price haggling and show that bargaining can become a trap, where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer's valuation). This arises when one party is impatient about capturing zero surplus (e.g., Rubinstein's example of fxed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with costless unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally remov...
-
作者：Perez-Castrillo, David; Sun, Chaoran
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Shanghai University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We define the proportional ordinal Shapley (the POSh) solution, an ordinal concept for pure exchange economies in the spirit of the Shapley value. Our construction is inspired by Hart and Mas-Colell's (1989) characterization of the Shapley value with the aid of a potential function. The POSh exists and is unique and essentially single-valued for a fairly general class of economies. It satisfies individual rationality, anonymity, and properties similar to the null-player and null-player out pro...
-
作者：Hillenbrand, Adrian; Verrina, Eugenio
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2
摘要：We study how positive narratives (stories in favor of a prosocial action) and negative narratives (stories in favor of a selfish action) influence prosocial behavior in a series of lab and online experiments with more than 1500 subjects. We find that, both positive and negative narratives are effective at changing how actions are perceived. However, while positive narratives increase prosocial behavior, negative narratives do not move aggregate behavior and - if anything - lead to slightly mor...
-
作者：Dvijotham, Krishnamurthy; Rabani, Yuval; Schulman, Leonard J.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study out-of-equilibrium price dynamics in Fisher markets. We develop a general framework in which sellers have (a) a set of atomic price update rules (APU), which are simple responses to a price vector; (b) a belief-formation procedure that simulates actions of other sellers (themselves using the APU) to some finite horizon in the future. Sellers use an APU to respond to a price vector they generate with the belief formation procedure. The framework allows sellers to have inconsistent and ...
-
作者：Papadimitriou, Christos; Pierrakos, George; Psomas, Alexandros; Rubinstein, Aviad
作者单位：Columbia University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Stanford University
摘要：We introduce a simple dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer offers two items in two consecutive stages to a single buyer. The buyer's joint distribution of valuations for the two items is known, and the buyer knows the valuation for the current item, but not for the one in the future. The designer seeks to maximize expected revenue, and the mechanism must be deterministic, truthful, and ex-post individually rational. We show that finding the optimum deterministic mechanism in ...
