Auctions with flexible information acquisition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kim, Kyungmin; Koh, Youngwoo
• 署名单位: Emory University; Korea University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.005
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 256-281
• 关键词: information acquisition; auctions; Posterior-separable information costs; concavification

摘要

We consider independent private value auctions in which prior to bidding, each bidder engages in fully flexible information acquisition, choosing not only how much information but also what information to acquire about his value. Focusing on a tractable environment with binary underlying values and posterior-separable information costs, we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and investigate the effects of information costs on auction outcomes. We also analyze how the reserve price influences bidders' information-acquisition behavior and study its implications for the seller's expected revenue. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.