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作者：de Castro, Luciano; Galvao, Antonio F.; Noussair, Charles N.; Qiao, Liang
作者单位：University of Iowa; Michigan State University; University of Arizona
摘要：Quantiles are used for decision making in investment analysis and in the mining, oil and gas industries. However, it is unknown how common quantile-based decision making actually is among typical individual decision makers. This paper describes an experiment that aims to (1) compare how common is decision making based on quantiles relative to expected utility maximization, and (2) estimate risk attitude parameters under the assumption of quantile preferences. The experiment has two parts. In t...
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作者：Steg, Jan-Henrik
作者单位：University of Graz
摘要：In Smirnov and Wait (2021), an iterative method is devised to identify subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of timing games. This note shows by simple examples that the identification is in fact neither necessary nor sufficient. The main issue is that the method does not fully reflect the requirements of subgame perfection, so there is a conceptual and not just a technical problem. (C) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper analyzes strategic information transmission between a sender and a receiver with similar objectives. We provide a first-order approximation of the equilibrium behavior in the general version of the Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model with a small bias. Our analysis goes beyond the usual uniform-quadratic setting: we uncover how the state-dependent bias and the non-uniform state distribution influence the precision with which each state of the world is communicated. We illustrate the a...
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作者：Allison, Blake A.; Bagh, Adib; Lepore, Jason J.
作者单位：Emory University; University of Kentucky; University of Kentucky; California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo
摘要：We consider classes of games for a fixed set of players with fixed strategy sets. For such classes, we analyze and develop the concept of invariance, which is satisfied when the set of Nash equilibria and corresponding equilibrium payoffs are identical for each payoff function within the class. We introduce the condition superior payoff matching, which requires that at any given strategy profile, each player can match her highest payoff near that strategy profile across all games within that c...
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作者：Matsushima, Hitoshi
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：We investigate the implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) from an epistemolog-ical perspective. We consider the possibility that in higher-order beliefs there exists an honest agent who is motivated by intrinsic preference for honesty as well as material in-terest. We assume weak honesty, in that, although any honest agent has a cost of lying that is positive but close to zero, she (or he) is mostly motivated by material interests and even tells white lies. This study assumes that al...
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作者：Lukyanov, Georgy; Shamruk, Konstantin; Su, Tong; Wakrim, Ahmed
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers, rendering full information revelation, in general infeasible. We demonstrate that an exogenous bias in the sender's preferences can improve public information provision and raise welfare. Two applications of the setup ar...
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作者：Vazirani, Vijay V.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik (1971) characterized the core of the assignment game using ideas from matching theory and LP-duality theory and their highly non-trivial interplay. Whereas the core of this game is always non-empty, that of the general graph matching game can be empty. This paper salvages the situation by giving an imputation in the 2/3-approximate core for the latter; moreover this imputation can be computed in polynomial time. This bound is best possible, since it is t...
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作者：Afacan, Mustafa Oguz
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：We introduce a college admission with tuition transfers problem. In this novel formulation, students' payments are not necessarily equal to their respective tuition fees. However, the total requested tuition fees must be equal to the total payment burden on students. We introduce two mechanism classes - the first is efficient, and the second is stable and constrained efficient. Because of general incompatibilities, neither of them is strategy-proof. Next, under certain suppositions, we introdu...
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作者：Samet, Dov
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：The impossibility of agreeing to disagree in the non-probabilistic setup means that agents cannot commonly know their decisions unless they are all the same. We study the relation of this property to the sure thing principle when it is expressed in epistemic terms. We show that it can be presented in two equivalent ways: one is in terms of knowledge operators, which we call the principle of follow the knowledgeable, the other is in terms of kens-bodies of agents' knowledge-which we call indepe...
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作者：Ivanov, Maxim; Sam, Alex
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：The paper considers a cheap-talk model in which the receiver privately selects the signal structure of the initially uninformed sender. After the sender privately observes a signal generated by the signal structure, the players play a standard cheap-talk game. We show that by randomizing between two perfectly informative signal structures, the receiver can elicit perfect information from the sender for the bias in preferences of any magnitude, including the case when the bias is the sender's p...
