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作者：Levine, DK; Martinelli, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：A long-run player, with private information about how long the game will last, must precommit to an action and faces a sequence of short-run players who get a noisy signal of that action. Since noise vanishes with time, we might expect a long-lived long-run player to behave as a Stackelberg leader. If so, short-run players may end up ignoring the signal. Then, however, the long-run player would have no reason to actually choose the Stackelberg action. We show that this paradox can be resolved ...
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作者：Kim, SK; Wang, SS
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper studies the characteristics of optimal contracts when the agent is risk-averse in the double moral-hazard situation in which the principal also participates in the production process. It is already known that a simple linear contract is one of many optimal contracts under the double moral-hazard when the agent is risk-neutral. We find that the agent's optimal incentive scheme in this case is unique and non-linear, but less sensitive to output than would be designed under a single mo...
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作者：Chakravarty, SR
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS)
摘要：This paper considers the Debreu-Farrell-Fare measure of efficiency of merger to compare economic efficiencies of alternative merged entities in a homogeneous good industry. The comparability results rely on concentration curve dominance relation and identify the class of cost functions for which efficiency ranking of the entities becomes unambiguous. The results have been developed under alternative assumptions about the total output and number of firms of the merging subgroups. (C) 1998 Acade...
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作者：Chen, XH; White, H
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Recently macroeconomists and game theorists have dropped the mutual consistency assumption for rational expectations equilibrium (REE) or Nash equilibrium (NE), considering instead plausible adaptive agent learning behaviors yielding sensible REE or NE. But when agents do not have detailed knowledge of the relevant equilibrium relations, they can easily arrive at incorrect belief equilibria which are not rational and have no optimality properties [14]. REE and NE thus lose plausibility as outc...
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作者：Jovanovic, B; Ueda, M
作者单位：New York University; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We study a monetary system in which final goods sell on spot markets, while labor and dividends sell through contracts. Firms and workers confuse absolute and relative price changes: A positive price-level shock makes sellers think they are producing better goods than they really are. They split this apparent windfall with workers who get a higher real wage. Hence, unexpected inflation shifts real income from firms (the principals) to workers (the agents), and thereby lowers stock-returns. A p...
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作者：Aoyagi, M
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This note presents a condition which guarantees the existence of a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism with budget balance when agents have quasi-linear utility functions. This condition requires correlation among agents' private signals (types), and is (1) simple and easy to verify, (2) good for any decision rule whether efficient or not, (3) valid even if agents' types are mutually payoff-relevant, and (4) true for almost every probability distribution of agents' types. (C) 1998 Academic...
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作者：Ching, S; Serizawa, S
作者单位：Shiga University of Medical Science; University of Osaka
摘要：In a recent paper, Sprumont (1991, Econometrica 59, 509-519) showed that the uniform rule (Benassy, 1982, The Economics of Market Disequilibrium, Academic Press, 1982) is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity, and efficiency on the single-peaked domain (Black, 1948, J. Polit. Econ. 56, 23-34). This result motivates us to investigate whether there is a larger domain on which there exists a nontrivial strategy-proof rule. We want such a domain to be as large as possible. We show...
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作者：Cressman, R; Schlag, KH
作者单位：Wilfrid Laurier University; University of Bonn
摘要：The evolutionary basis for predicting the backwards induction solution in finite extensive-form games with perfect information is examined. Evolution is modelled using the replicator dynamic in combination with rare perturbations that introduce a small change in the proportion of each strategy. The criterion for our judgement is whether this dynamic stabilizes over time at the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. We find that the backwards induction solution is fully justified by this process ...
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作者：Chari, VV; Christiano, LJ; Eichelbaum, M
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Northwestern University; Federal Reserve System - USA; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a dynamic model with optimizing private agents and a benevolent, optimizing monetary authority that cannot commit to future policies. We characterize the set of sustainable equilibria and discuss the implications for institutional reform. We show that there are equilibria in which the monetary authority pursues inflationary policies because that is what private agents expect. We call such equilibria expectation traps. Alternative institutional arrangements for the conduct of monetar...
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作者：DeMarzo, P; Skiadas, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Northwestern University
摘要：We identify and analyze a class of economies with asymmetric information that we call quasi-complete. For quasi-complete economies we determine equilibrium trades, show that the set of fully informative equilibria is a singleton, and give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative equilibria. Besides unifying some familiar settings, such as those of Grossman (1976) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982), the following new results are proved: (a) The same restrictions...
