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作者：Shimoji, M; Watson, J
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We propose a notion of conditional dominance for games whose representations designate information sets. We prove that iterated conditional dominance is equivalent to extensive form rationalizability. We also conduct a general analysis of these concepts, yielding new insights on rationalizability and on the equivalence of solutions when applied to different representations of a game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C63, C72, C73. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Kocherlakota, N; Wallace, N
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study a random-matching, absence-of-double-coinsidence environment in which people cannot precommit and in which there are two imperfect ways to keep track of what other people have done in the past: money and a public record of all past actions that is updated with an average lag. We study how the magnitude of that lag affects the allocations that are optimal from among allocations that are stationary and feasible and that satisfy incentive constraints which arise from the absence of commi...
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作者：Ben-Porath, E
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Let P be a correlated equilibrium distribution on the set of outcomes of a fame G. Can P be implemented by some cheap pre-play procedure that does not involve a mediator? It is shown that if there are two distinct Nash equilibrium payoffs for each player in G and if P is rational (that is, consists of probabilities which are rational numbers) and generates for each player i an expected payoff which is above her worst Nash equilibrium payoff, then P can be virtually implemented in a sequential ...
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作者：Heifetz, A; Polemarchakis, HM
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We exhibit a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium, where no individual knows the state of the world or the quantities traded by any other individual. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Al-Najjar, NI
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：The paper develops a framework for factor analysis and arbitrage pricing in a large asset economy modeled as one with a continuum of assets. It is shown that the assumptions of absence of arbitrage opportunities and that returns have a strict Factor structure imply exact factor-pricing for a Full measure of assets. Interpreting finite subsets of assets as random draws from the underlying economy, there is probability one that every asset in a finite sample is exactly Factor-priced. It is furth...
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作者：Fiestras-Janeiro, G; Borm, P; van Megen, F
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper introduces the notions of protective and prudent equilibria in the context of finite games in strategic form. It turns out that for games both notions are in fact equivalent. Moreover, it is shown that for matrix games the set of protective equilibria equals the set of proper equilibria. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Chang, R
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
摘要：This paper develops recursive methods to study optimal and time consistent policy in dynamic models. We analyze a version of Calvo's 1978 monetary model and show that its time consistent outcomes can be completely characterized as the largest fixed point of either of two operators. Recursive application of these operators provides a computing algorithm which always converges to the set of time consistent outcomes. Finally, we obtain valuable information about the nature of time consistent outc...
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作者：Green, EJ; Zhou, RL
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We consider a version of Kiyotaki and Wright's monetary search model in which agents can hold arbitrary amounts of divisible money. A continuum of stationary equilibria, indexed by the aggregate real money stock, exists with all trading occurring at a single price. There is always a maximum level of the real money stock consistent with existence of such an equilibrium. In the limit as trading becomes faster relative to discounting, any real money stock becomes feasible in such an equilibrium. ...
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作者：Acemoglu, D
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper offers a model of credit markets with adverse selection and moral hazard. The equilibrium is highly inefficient, and the underlying reason is the zero-profit condition imposed by competing financial intermediaries which gives very high powered incentives to entrepreneurs. The paper demonstrates that when entrepreneurs can hire a manager to run their projects, the inefficiencies are prevented. This is because the manager is not the residual claimant of the returns, and hence has low ...
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作者：Kajii, A
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：This paper studies the regularity of competitive equilibria in a two period exchange economy with one asset where a sunspot signal is observed in the beginning of the second period. It is shown that an equilibrium which does not depend on sunspots is regular if and only if it is sequentially regular as an equilibrium of the economy without sunspots. Hence if the asset is real, a sequential regular equilibrium is robust against any sunspot structure, which may be endogenously generated. (C) 199...
