Reputation with noisy precommitment
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Levine, DK; Martinelli, C
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2344
发表日期：
1998
页码：
55-75
关键词：
摘要：
A long-run player, with private information about how long the game will last, must precommit to an action and faces a sequence of short-run players who get a noisy signal of that action. Since noise vanishes with time, we might expect a long-lived long-run player to behave as a Stackelberg leader. If so, short-run players may end up ignoring the signal. Then, however, the long-run player would have no reason to actually choose the Stackelberg action. We show that this paradox can be resolved if there is a chance that the long-run player chooses other action by mistake, and the signal is sufficiently informative. (C) 1998 Academic Press.